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[T]he Appellate judges asked my attorneys and me (the plaintiff) to leave 
the courtroom, so that the government attorneys could secretly answer ques-
tions and make their argument. The guards escorted us, the plaintiff, out, 
locked the doors, and stood there in front of the courtroom and watched us 
for about fifteen minutes. So much for finally having my day in court; here 
I was, with my attorneys, standing outside the courtroom and being 
guarded, while in there, three judges were having a cozy mingling session 
with a large troop of government attorneys. Then, it was over; that was it; 
we were told to leave. In other words, my attorneys and I were barred from 
being present in our own court hearing, and my case remained covered up 
and gagged . . . .1
INTRODUCTION 
Somewhere between the designations of “patriot”2 and “night-
mare”3 lies the truth about Sibel Edmonds.  Somewhere between lies 
either one of the more troubling untold stories of the investigation of 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Drew 
University.  The author would like to thank Professor Thomas Healy, Eric Schreiber, 
and Paulyn Holandez for their invaluable guidance, support, and dedication. 
 1 Sibel Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead (May 14, 2005), 
http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/ 
May14-05-Gagged%20but%20not%20Dead.htm [hereinafter Edmonds, Gagged, but 
Not Dead]. 
 2 David Rose, An Inconvenient Patriot, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2005, at 264, 264; Press 
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Sibel Edmonds v. Department of Justice: A 
Patriot Silenced, Fighting to Keep America Safe (Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Ed-
monds Press Release 1], http://informationclearinghouse.info/article9774.htm. 
 3 Christopher Deliso, An Interview with Sibel Edmonds, ANTIWAR.COM, July 1, 2004, 
http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=2917 (“[O]ne of the top guys . . . called 
me a ‘nightmare.’”). 
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the September 11 attacks,4 or a hoax.  Yet Edmonds’ tale remains im-
prisoned by multiple gag orders5 and, more pertinent to this Com-
ment, the state secrets evidence privilege.6
Edmonds is a former FBI contract linguist who sued the Bureau, 
alleging that she was terminated for blowing the whistle on rampant 
corruption and espionage in the Bureau translation department.7  
She claims she approached her superiors with allegations of more 
than just garden variety malfeasance in her department—specifically, 
infiltration of the department by organized crime and foreign intelli-
gence, as well as distortion and misdirection of the September 11 in-
vestigation and other terrorism probes.8  An investigative journalist, 
culling sources from each rung of the FBI and Department of Justice 
ladder that Edmonds visited in raising her complaints, has argued 
that the case intersects with ongoing investigations of illegal payments 
allegedly made to members of Congress.9
Despite mainstream media coverage of Edmonds’ story,10 the at-
tention of Congressmen and Senators,11 and the intervention of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),12 Edmonds has yet to have a 
 4 See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, We Should Have Had Orange or Red-Type of Alert in June or 
July of 2001, SALON.COM, March 26, 2004, http://www.salon.com/news/ 
feature/2004/03/26/translator/index_np.html. 
 5 Scott Horton, Cracking the Case: An Interview with Sibel Edmonds, ANTIWAR.COM, 
Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/horton.php?articleid=7032 (“I have 
several gag orders.  In fact, based on the research that my attorneys, the ACLU, has 
[sic] conducted, I am the most gagged person in United States history . . . .”). 
 6 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 
161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005). 
 7 Complaint, Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(No. 02-1448) [hereinafter Edmonds 2002 Complaint], available at 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/spy/edmonds.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005). 
 8 See id; Complaint at ¶¶ 4–5, Edmonds v. United States, No. 1:05CV00540 
(D.D.C. March 16, 2005) [hereinafter Edmonds 2005 Complaint], available at 
http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/Final-SFX503-Mar16-05.pdf. 
 9 Rose, supra note 2, at 281. 
 10 See Eric Lichtblau, Whistleblowing Said to Be Factor in FBI Firing, N.Y. TIMES, July 
29, 2004, at A1; Paula Zahn Now (CNN television broadcast Jan. 14, 2005), transcript 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0501/14/pzn.01.html; 60 
Minutes (CBS television broadcast Aug. 8, 2004), transcript available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/25/60minutes/main526954.shtml. 
 11 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Members of Congress 
Pledge Support for FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, (March 3, 2005)  
[hereinafter “Edmonds Press Release 2”], http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/ 
SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17640&c=206; Letter from U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy and 
Charles Grassley to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft (July 9, 2004), 
http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/Leahy_Grassley_Letter_to_Ashcrof
t_7-9-04.pdf. 
 12 See Edmonds Press Release 1, supra note 2. 
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day in court.  That is because the Bush administration has thus far 
prevailed in invoking the state secrets privilege,13 a little-known and 
rarely deployed14 tool of evidence law that courts and the press alike 
have referred to as “draconian.”15  The District Court for the District 
of Columbia agreed with Attorney General Ashcroft’s assessment that 
the procession of Edmonds’ claim would result in the disclosure of 
evidence that would be harmful to national security, and dismissed 
the action.16  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed in an 
unpublished opinion.17  The U.S. Supreme Court denied Edmonds’ 
petition for a writ of certiorari.18
What is the state secrets privilege?19  It has been described as an 
evidence privilege dating back to eighteenth-century English juris-
prudence,20 protecting military and diplomatic secrets of the Execu-
tive in the name of the common good.21  The Supreme Court af-
firmed its existence in 1953, holding it an absolute privilege against 
 13 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 
161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005). 
 14 The state secrets privilege has been invoked just over sixty times since 1953.  See 
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. 
Q. 85, 101, 109 (2005) (tallying fifty-five uses of the privilege from 1953–2001 and 
seven since 2001).  But see William Fisher, “State Secrets” Privilege Not So Rare, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 15, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/ 
news.asp?idnews=29902 (arguing that over sixty uses of the privilege indicates usage 
is not rare). 
 15 In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 
2d at 81; Rose, supra note 2, at 266. 
 16 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 81–82. 
 17 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 734 (2005). 
 18 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005). 
 19 For a discussion of the state secrets privilege in the context of privileges gener-
ally, see 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 509 (Jo-
seph M. McLaughlin ed., 1996); 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL AND CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 224–27 (rev. ed. 1985). 
 20 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97 (describing the Trial of Maha Rajah 
Nundocomar, (1775) 20 Howell’s State Trials 923 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)). 
 21 See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1953); Beatson v. 
Skene, (1860) 5 Hurlstone & Norman 838, 853, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415, 1421 (“[I]f the 
production of a State paper would be injurious to the public service, the general 
public interest must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor . . 
. .”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 92 (“[T]he ultimate reason for upholding 
[the privilege’s] use is . . . that it is necessary to the survival of the state.”); 2 LOUISELL 
& MUELLER, supra note 19 at 961 (“The state secrets privilege is but a single instance 
in a larger effort, undertaken in the interest of self preservation, to keep certain sen-
sitive information out of the hands of persons who might sell it or use it to the injury 
or detriment of the nation.”). 
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discovery,22 and has not formally revisited it since.  The Court did not 
hold that the privilege was constitutionally based.23
The privilege has been invoked in cases that seem to have clearly 
warranted its application, such as commercial litigation involving de-
fense contracts where sensitive documents describing secret military 
equipment were at issue.24  The state secrets privilege has also reared 
its head, however, in cases where plaintiffs sued the government over 
constitutional violations25 or blew the whistle on government prac-
tices that allegedly threatened national security.26
The growth of the national security state has required increasing 
levels of executive secrecy and deference to that secrecy.27  The use of 
the privilege has been on the rise, however, since the Carter admini-
stration,28 and the current administration has broadened the scope of 
information over which it claims privilege.29  Courts and commenta-
 22 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7, 11. 
 23 Id. at 6 (“Both positions [urged by the parties] have constitutional overtones 
which we find it unnecessary to pass upon . . . .”). 
 24 See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 397–98 
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Virtual Defs. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 
2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2000), appeal dismissed, No. 00-5427, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7468 
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2001); N.S.N. Int’l Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Numours & Co., 140 
F.R.D. 275, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 25 See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1116-17 (8th Cir. 1995) (alleging 
a violation of Fourth Amendment rights); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 473–74 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (claiming violations stemming from FBI COINTELPRO program); 
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 52–54 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (alleging a warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance in retaliation for leaking the Pentagon Papers to the press). 
 26 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 69 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F. 
App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005); Order at 1, Horn v. Hud-
dle, No. 94-1756 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/jud/statesec/horn072804.pdf.  See also J.F.O. McAllister, Getting in the Way of 
Good Policy: A U.S. Drug Enforcer in Burma Sues His Colleagues for Scuttling His Best Efforts 
to Curb Trafficking, TIME, Nov. 7, 1994, at 50 (reporting the allegations of Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) whistleblower Richard Horn). 
 27 Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or 
Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 576 (1982) [hereinafter The Military and 
State Secrets Privilege] (“In the current international setting . . . matters as diverse as 
international trade, manufacturing techniques, natural resource supplies, social un-
rest, and even meteorological conditions can affect national security.”). 
 28 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 101 (“[B]etween the decision in Reynolds 
and the election of Jimmy Carter, in 1976, there were four reported cases in which 
the government invoked the privilege.  Between 1977 and 2001, there were a total of 
fifty-one reported cases in which courts ruled on invocation of the privilege.”). 
 29 Id. at 111.  President Bush, through Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 
56025 (2001), extended authority to invoke the state secrets privilege to former 
presidents.  Moreover, he has extended this authority to the Secretaries of Agricul-
ture and Health and Human Services, as well as the head of the EPA.  Weaver & Pal-
litto, supra note 14, at 111. 
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tors agree that the state secrets privilege is in tension with individual 
litigants’ rights.30 It also clashes with notions of transparency that in-
here in a democracy.31
This Comment proposes that the state secrets privilege be re-
formed in order to prevent executive abuses.  Part I traces the history 
of the privilege before 1953.  Part II discusses the landmark 1953 Su-
preme Court case of United States v. Reynolds,32 the rule it announced 
and its rationale, and brief Supreme Court treatments of Reynolds in 
United States v. Nixon33 and Tenet v. Doe.34  Part III describes the lower 
courts’ handling of Reynolds, assesses proposed Rule of Evidence 509, 
the only congressional attempt at codifying the state secrets privilege, 
and categorizes types of state secrets cases.  Part IV reviews the Ed-
monds case and the grave implications for national security it may 
hold.  Finally, Part V evaluates commentators’ suggestions for reform 
and proposes that where a whistleblower plaintiff alleges government 
actions or omissions that have threatened or are threatening national 
security, the state secrets privilege must be transformed into a quali-
fied privilege in which the government faces a heightened standard 
for successful invocation. 
I. THE HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
The genesis of the state secrets privilege is not precisely known,35 
but English experience with a form of the privilege dates back to the 
late eighteenth century.36  The Court in Reynolds described American 
 30 See generally 1 CHARLES MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 107 at 
423 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. West Group 1999) (1954).  McCormick writes: 
As the activities of modern government have expanded, the need of 
litigants for the disclosure and proof of documents and other informa-
tion in the possession of government officials has correspondingly in-
creased . . . .  When this need is asserted and opposed, the public inter-
est in the secrecy of “classified” information comes into direct conflict 
with the public interest in the protection of the claim of the individual 
to due process of law in the redress of grievances. 
Id. 
 31 President John F. Kennedy, Address “The President and the Press” Before the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association, 1 PUB. PAPERS 334 (Apr. 27, 1961) 
(“The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society . . . .”); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 128, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (“Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking . . . .”). 
 32 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 33 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 34 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 35 The Military and State Secrets Privilege, supra note 27, at 571. 
 36 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97 (describing the Trial of Maha Rajah 
Nundocomar, (1775) 20 State Trials 923 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)). 
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experience with the privilege as “limited,”37 yet an American court 
encountered an invocation of privilege covering military and diplo-
matic secrets at least as far back as 1807.38  Moreover, the Framers de-
bated the role of secrecy in the constitutional order even earlier than 
that.39  Thus the state secrets privilege, as it currently stands in Ameri-
can jurisprudence, can be said to spring from two sources: first, Eng-
lish common law,40 and second, the political debates and practices of 
the Framers at the time of the Founding and the early years of the 
republic.41
A. English Common Law 
An understanding of a “crown privilege” granting authority to 
the monarch’s counselors and ministers to resist compulsion of secret 
information dates back to Blackstone and can be found in practice in 
the late eighteenth century.42  Blackstone in his Commentaries ex-
plained, “[T]he duty of a Privy Counselor appears from the oath of 
office, [which requires the Counselor] to keep the King’s counsel se-
cret . . . [and] to withstand all persons who would attempt the con-
trary.”43  In 1775, Governor General of India Warren Hastings em-
ployed the same reasoning in instructing his secretary to refuse to 
produce the books of the East India Company in the face of a judicial 
request, arguing they contained secrets important to the safety of 
Great Britain.44  The court agreed that “curious and impertinent 
eyes” should not have access to the materials, but was firm in admon-
ishing that a magistrate, not a Crown official, had the final say as to 
when evidence must be produced.45
 37 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). 
 38 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) 
(Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice, held that Burr had the right to pro-
duction of a letter from General Wilkinson to President Jefferson but that any ele-
ments whose exposure would threaten “public safety” would be suppressed). 
 39 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94–95. 
 40 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 93. 
 41 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94–95. 
 42 Id. at 97. 
 43 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 230–31 (St. 
George Tucker ed., 1803) (1765). 
 44 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97. 
 45 Id. (citing the Trial of Maha Rajah Nundocomar, (1775) 20 Howell’s State Tri-
als 923, 1057 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)).  The court said that a magistrate has 
this power “where justice shall require copies of the records and proceedings, from 
the highest court of judicature, down to the court of Pie-Powder.”  Id. (quoting Nun-
docomar, 20 Howell’s State Trials at 1057). 
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Despite this admonition, the Crown prevailed in all reported 
cases in which it claimed that keeping documents secret was in the 
public interest.46  The holding in the 1860 case of Beatson v. Skene47 
sums up the approach of the British courts in the early cases broach-
ing the subject: “[I]f the production of a State paper would be injuri-
ous to the public service, the general public interest must be consid-
ered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a Court of 
justice . . . .”48
Two important issues arose in the early privilege cases: first, what 
form a proper objection to production should take; and second, 
whether an assertion of privilege should be conclusive.49  On the first 
subject, British courts came to require that a political head of a de-
partment at least personally consider documents in issue before a 
subordinate raises an objection, if not physically appear to make the 
objection himself.50  On the second subject a split of authority 
emerged, with one approach favoring judicial inspection of purport-
edly privileged materials and another calling for total deference to 
the crown.51
In 1942, the House of Lords set out the modern British state se-
crets rule in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co.52  Lord Chancellor Vis-
count, writing for the majority, affirmed the requirement that a de-
partment head personally consider the materials in issue53 and held 
that “an objection validly taken to production, on the ground that 
this would be injurious to the public interest, is conclusive . . . .”54  
The court also asserted, however, that decisions concerning these 
matters were to be made by judges, not government officials.55  The 
court set out grounds that would not be sufficient to make an invoca-
tion of privilege valid: the mere fact that a document is marked 
“state,” “official,” or “confidential”; fear of opening up a department 
to criticism or parliamentary investigation; the possibility that pro-
duction would require the testimony of officials who have significant 
 46 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97. 
 47 (1860) 5 Hurlstone & Norman 838, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415 (Exch.). 
 48 Id. at 1421. 
 49 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird, & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 636–37 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
 50 Id. at 637–38 (citing Beatson, 157 Eng. Rep. 1415; Hennessy v. Wright, (1888) 
21 Q.B.D. 509; Kain v. Farrer, (1877) 37 L.T. 469 (C.P.)). 
 51 Id. at 638–40 (comparing Hennessy with Beatson and others). 
 52 [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.). 
 53 Id. at 638. 
 54 Id. at 642. 
 55 Id. 
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duties elsewhere; and the chance that production may expose inade-
quacies within a department or expose it to liability.56  Lord Chancel-
lor Viscount did not, however, explain how a court might probe a 
department head’s motives in asserting privilege.57
B. The Development of the Privilege in American Jurisprudence 
Withholding information from Congress actually predates the 
Founding, as the Committee of Secret Correspondence refused to 
share materials with the rest of the Continental Congress, citing an 
inability to trust a large political body with lives at stake.58  Later the 
Framers debated the role secrecy should play in the republic.59  James 
Wilson made the case for transparency,60 while Elbridge Gerry, Roger 
Sherman, and John Jay favored secrecy in limited circumstances relat-
ing to “treaties and military operations.”61  Specifically, Jay argued: 
[I]t seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties . . . but that 
perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite . . . 
and there doubtless are many [people] who would rely on the se-
crecy of the president, but who would not confide in that of the 
Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly.62
The debate over secrecy continued into the Washington admini-
stration.63  In 1792, President Washington was confronted with House 
efforts to investigate a Native American attack on the army, prompt-
ing the President and his advisers to consider the possibility of with-
holding information from Congress.64  Washington concluded that 
the President may not disclose certain papers, citing political, rather 
than constitutional, reasons.65  His advisers posited that where disclo-
sure would be injurious to the public, papers should be kept secret; 
they did not, however, cite any authority for this position.66
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at 642–43. 
 58 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 64 at 392 (John Jay)(Clinton Rossiter ed. 
1961)). 
 63 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 94–95. 
 64 Id. at 94–95 (citing 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 257 (Charles T. Cullen 
ed., Princeton University Press 1990) (1792) [hereinafter Jefferson Papers]).  The 
attack in issue was the massacre of Major General St. Clair’s army in 1791, in which 
over 600 soldiers were killed.  See generally Arthur St. Clair, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_St._Clair (last modified Sept. 2, 2005). 
 65 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 95. 
 66 Id. (citing Jefferson Papers, supra note 64, at 262). 
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In 1796, the President withheld information from Congress in 
the face of an official request for the first time.67  The House had 
asked to examine the instructions given to the minister to Great Brit-
ain relating to the Jay Treaty.68  Washington refused.69  This time he 
claimed his power was based in the Constitution, reasoning that the 
President alone had the power to make treaties.70
The trial of Aaron Burr saw a key development of the state se-
crets privilege, judicial recognition of the need for nondisclosure 
where disclosure of a document would be harmful to the public.71  At 
the trial, Burr sought the production of a letter from General Wilkin-
son to President Jefferson.72  Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit 
Justice, issued a subpoena duces tecum to Jefferson to produce the let-
ter, but determined that any elements of the correspondence that 
would threaten “public safety” would be suppressed.73
In 1875, the Supreme Court decided Totten v. United States,74 a 
case that concerned a matter closely related to the modern state se-
crets privilege.  In Totten, the plaintiff sued for breach of contract, al-
leging he had entered into an agreement with President Lincoln in 
which he would spy on the Confederates behind enemy lines in ex-
change for monthly payments.75  The Court held that where the con-
tract in issue is one to perform “secret services,” the case must be 
dismissed, as it will inevitably result in the disclosure of confidential 
information.76  Determining first that the President may make such 
secret agreements pursuant to his commander-in-chief powers, the 
Court reasoned that the very subject matter of the case—the spy con-
tract made between the plaintiff and President Lincoln—was an item 
of confidential information that may never be disclosed.77  Therefore, 
the majority reasoned, any suit brought to enforce such a contract 
must be dismissed on the pleadings, as the secret information would 
 67 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 95. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. (noting that “virtually every president since has justified withholding infor-
mation from Congress on the same separation of powers grounds”). 
 71 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); 
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 95. 
 72 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32. 
 73 Id. at 37. 
 74 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 75 Id. at 105–06. 
 76 Id. at 107. 
 77 Id. at 106–07. 
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inevitably be disclosed.78  The Court added that dismissal is required 
in cases in which confidential information that exists between a priest 
and a penitent, a husband and a wife, an attorney and a client, and a 
physician and a patient will inevitably be disclosed.79  The Court did 
not mention, however, any protected item of confidential government 
information other than a contract to perform secret services, nor did 
it announce any general rule governing the state secrets privilege.80
The proposition that certain evidence ought to be privileged in 
order to protect military secrets is found in a few cases reported in 
the early decades of the twentieth century.  In Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Co.,81 the district judge held that in a commercial dis-
pute the Navy was permitted on grounds of “public policy” to refuse 
to furnish blueprints of armor-piercing projectiles in development.82  
In Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,83 a patent infringement action, the 
court held that the government could intervene to claim privilege as 
to the plans of certain weapons systems that the plaintiff had moved 
the court to order produced.84  Finally, in Bank Line, Ltd. v. United 
States,85 the Second Circuit declined to issue a writ of mandamus 
where the court below had ordered the production of Navy records 
relating to a ship collision in World War II, but suggested that the dis-
trict court, on remand, consider Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co.86 in 
determining the question of privilege.87
Firth and Pollen marked an evolution of the Totten rule towards 
the modern state secrets privilege.  In both Firth and Pollen, the suits 
were allowed to proceed even though the court had held that the 
evidence in issue was a privileged military secret.88  This practice of 
 78 Id. at 107. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.  Over a century after Totten, the Supreme Court af-
firmed its holding in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).  The Court also distinguished 
the Totten rule from the state secrets privilege.  Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9. 
 81 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912). 
 82 Id. at 356. 
 83 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 84 Id. at 585–86 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)) (reasoning 
that peacetime decisions as to military secrecy should be left to the Executive). 
 85 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 86 [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 87 Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 88 See Pollen, 26 F. Supp. at 586 (denying motion to compel discovery, but not 
dismissing case); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 356 
(E.D. Penn. 1912) (same).  The Pollen case was litigated until 1940, while Firth was 
litigated until 1915.  See Pollen, 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940); Firth, 216 F. 755 (D. Pa. 
1914), rev’d, 224 F. 937 (2d Cir. 1915). 
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severing privileged evidence and allowing a case to continue was dis-
tinguishable from the Totten situation in which a case must be dis-
missed where it could not proceed without disclosure of confidential 
information.89
II. THE REYNOLDS RULE AND ITS RATIONALE 
In United States v. Reynolds,90 decided in 1953, the Supreme Court 
for the first time addressed whether the government could invoke a 
privilege as to certain evidence where it claimed disclosure would be 
harmful to the public.91  The plaintiffs had sued the government un-
der the Tort Claims Act after their husbands, civilian observers 
aboard an Air Force B-29 bomber, were killed when the plane 
crashed.92
The plaintiffs moved the district court to compel production of 
the official Air Force accident report, and the court granted the mo-
tion.93  The Secretary of the Air Force then sent a letter to the court 
stating that the report could not be furnished because it would be 
against the “public interest.”94  The court permitted a rehearing on 
the matter, where the Secretary filed a formal “Claim of Privilege” in 
which he stated that the bomber had been on a “highly secret mis-
sion” the day of the crash.95  Moreover, the Judge Advocate General 
of the Air Force filed an affidavit in which he contended that disclo-
sure of the report would threaten national security and offered to 
“produce the three surviving crew members, without cost, for exami-
nation by the plaintiffs.”96  In response to the “Claim of Privilege” and 
the affidavits, the court ordered the Air Force to submit the report 
for its examination so that it could determine whether the document 
should be privileged.97  The government refused.98  The court then 
ordered that all facts alleged on the plaintiffs’ claim of negligence be 
established in their favor.99
 89 Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. 
 90 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 91 See id. at 7 (“Judicial experience with the privilege which protects military and 
state secrets has been limited in this country.”). 
 92 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950). 
 93 Id. at 469, 471–72. 
 94 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 990–91. 
 98 Id. at 991. 
 99 Id. 
RAPAFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  11:48:35 AM 
244 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:233 
 
A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
affirmed.100  The court first held that such a claim of privilege pre-
sented a justiciable question, governed by the laws of evidence upon 
submission of the materials in issue in camera.101  Moreover, the panel 
held that to permit the government to conclusively determine the 
status of its own claim of privilege was to unconstitutionally “abdicate 
the judicial function.”102
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded by a vote of six to 
three.103  Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority, first declined 
to address the case on constitutional grounds, despite the briefs of 
both sides urging the Court to do so.104  The Court observed that 
American courts had not had much experience with an evidence 
privilege protecting military secrets, but noted that such a privilege 
was well-established at English common law.105  The majority cited the 
British case Duncan v. Cammell, Laird and Co., Ltd.106 in demonstrating 
the existence of the privilege in England and relied upon it in formu-
lating its holding on the American state secrets privilege.107
The Court announced a set of procedural requirements and a 
standard of review for cases in which the government invokes the 
privilege to protect military secrets.108  Only the government may as-
sert the privilege, and it may not be waived by private individuals.109  
“It is not to be lightly invoked.”110  Only a department head may in-
voke the privilege, and only after personally reviewing the materials 
 100 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 101 Id. at 997. 
 102 Id. 
 103 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).  Justices Black, Frankfurter, 
and Jackson dissented.  Id. 
 104 Id. at 6.  For an argument that the Reynolds decision may have been in fact con-
stitutionally based, see 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at 509–20. 
 105 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
 106 [1942] A.C. 624, 636-37; see supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 107 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 nn.15 & 20–22.  It has been argued that the Court’s reli-
ance on Duncan was “improvident” given that separation of powers has a decidedly 
less prominent role in British governance and that Duncan, like Reynolds, was a re-
sponse to a military exigency, World War II.  Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 99–
100.  The Third Circuit in Reynolds distinguished Duncan by noting the differences 
between American and British notions of separation of powers.  Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 
997 (“[W]hatever may be true in Great Britain the Government of the United States 
is one of checks and balances.”) (footnote omitted). 
 108 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–11. 
 109 Id. at 7. 
 110 Id. 
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in issue.111  It is incumbent upon the court to determine whether the 
materials should be privileged, but it should not do so through a 
practice that forces disclosure of the very evidence for which the gov-
ernment asserts privilege.112  Yet the majority asserted that final au-
thority rests with the court, “not the caprice of executive officers.”113  
The Court held that the government will prevail on an invocation of 
privilege to protect military secrets wherever it can demonstrate “a 
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose mili-
tary matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged.”114  Unlike other executive privileges, the state secrets privi-
lege is absolute: no showing of a litigant’s necessity can overcome an 
invocation that meets the standard above, and necessity will only be 
considered in determining the extent to which a court need review 
the merits of the government’s claim of privilege.115  Thus, where a 
litigant demonstrates great need for the evidence, an invocation of 
privilege “should not be lightly accepted”;116 where such need seems 
lacking, however, the assertion of a department head may be conclu-
sive.117
The Court thus outlined how a state secrets dispute should play 
out before a district court.  In response to a discovery request, a de-
partment head may file a formal claim of privilege stating that, after 
personal consideration, he or she has determined that production 
presents a reasonable danger that a military secret will be divulged.118  
Where the litigant’s need for the evidence is dubious, the claim of 
privilege will be conclusive.119  Where there is greater need, a court 
 111 Id. at 7–8.  The Court did not elaborate on which executive officers are “de-
partment head[s],” nor did it describe just what form a proper invocation should 
take.  In calling for a “department head” to claim privilege, the majority cited the 
Duncan requirement that he or she be the “political head of the department.”  Id. at 8 
n.20 (quoting Duncan, [1942] A.C. at 638) (emphasis added).  Since the invocation 
of the Secretary of the Air Force was sufficient in this case, the standard apparently 
does not require a Cabinet-level officer.  As for the proper form of an invocation, the 
Court called only for a “formal claim of privilege . . . lodged . . . after actual personal 
consideration . . . .”  Id. (footnote omitted).  This indicates that a claim need not be 
supported by an affidavit, though it should be noted that in Reynolds the Judge Advo-
cate General supported the Secretary’s claim with an affidavit.  Id. at 4–5. 
 112 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. 
 113 Id. at 9–10. 
 114 Id. at 10. 
 115 Id. at 11. 
 116 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 7–8. 
 119 Id. at 11. 
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may probe the merits of the formal claim further,120 though always 
with an eye towards avoiding disclosure of a military secret, even to 
the court itself, wherever possible.121
Though the Court held for the United States in Reynolds, it did 
not dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim.  The majority rather remanded for 
further proceedings, reasoning that as the purportedly top secret 
electronic equipment had no causal relation to the crash, plaintiffs 
could still prove causation without the accident report.122 The major-
ity further noted that the government had made certain “alternatives” 
available to plaintiffs, such as the production of witnesses at no cost, 
and that plaintiffs should take advantage of them.123  The parties 
eventually reached a settlement.124
Why was the Court so eager to clasp to the holding of Duncan 
and usher the state secrets privilege onto these shores?  First, the ma-
jority noted that the time (1953) was one of “vigorous preparation for 
national defense.”125  Specifically, for purposes of the case at bar, the 
Court reasoned that air power was vital to national defense and the 
exposure of any secrets relating to it could be harmful.126  Finally, the 
Court distinguished the case from criminal cases, where the govern-
ment must dismiss the charges against a defendant if it asserts privi-
lege over evidence material to the accused’s defense.127  Chief Justice 
Vinson reasoned that in the instant case the government was the de-
fendant and the non-moving party (i.e., party not seeking privileged 
material) and was thus fully within its rights to assert the privilege.128
At the time, Reynolds fit neatly into what is the generally accepted 
rationale for the role of privileges in evidence law.129  Wigmore lists 
four conditions that must be met in order for a privilege to arise: 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 10 (“[T]he court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is 
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the 
judge alone, in chambers.”). 
 122 Id. at 10. 
 123 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11–12. 
 124 Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at 
*6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 1909 (2006). 
 125 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 126 Id. at 10. 
 127 Id. at 12. 
 128 Id. 
 129 For a discussion of privilege, see generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JOSEPH P. 
KINNEARY, WEISSENBURGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501 (3d ed. 1998); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 19, ¶¶ 501–13; 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, §§ 200–49; 
1 MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 72–143. 
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be discussed; 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulously fostered; 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of 
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained 
for the correct disposal of litigation.130
Any effort to protect military secrets and diplomatic secrets, 
which the Supreme Court later stated was included in the state se-
crets privilege,131 easily satisfies these first three conditions.  Yet one 
can argue that in certain cases the state secrets privilege does not sat-
isfy Wigmore’s fourth condition; that is, the injury of disclosure is not 
greater than the benefit the evidence provides to the litigant, because 
it is possible that a plaintiff simply cannot proceed without such evi-
dence,132 while disclosure may only cause embarrassment at worst.  
But the Court in Reynolds correctly cast the potential injury as a public 
injury, while the benefit to be gained was only private.133  Thus, the 
facts of the case actually dictate that the disposition be an easy one: 
on one side, the private litigants suffered a tragic loss but were really 
only three tort plaintiffs suing over a plane crash, while on the other 
side top-secret military equipment at the height of the Cold War was 
at stake.  According to this reasoning, however, the calculus should 
change where the moving party can demonstrate that a public interest 
in disclosure outweighs the interest in non-disclosure that the gov-
ernment asserts. 
Recently declassified documents indicate that Reynolds itself may 
demonstrate everything wrong with the state secrets privilege.  The 
documents reveal that the B-29 in fact was not carrying any secret 
electronic equipment.134  After declassification, relatives of the Rey-
nolds plaintiffs sought to set aside the settlement reached in 1953, ar-
guing that the Secretary of the Air Force perpetrated a fraud upon 
 130 WEISSENBERGER & KINNEARY, supra note 129, § 501.3 (citing 8 WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
 131 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 618, 706 (1974). 
 132 See infra Part IV. 
 133 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–11 (discussing the respective importance of potential 
danger to national security and a litigant’s need for evidence). 
 134 Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at 
*6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 1909 (2006); see also Barry Siegel, The Secret of the B-29, L.A. TIMES, April 18, 
2004, at A1. 
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the court in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.135  The 
district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, reasoning 
that no fraud was committed since, while no secret equipment was on 
board, the accident report contained details of the workings of a B-29 
that could have been beneficial to enemy intelligence in 1953.136
The Supreme Court has never revisited Reynolds, but its brief en-
counters with the case in 1974 and 2005 indicate that it is still good 
law.  In United States v. Nixon,137 decided in 1974, the Court distin-
guished a President’s generalized interest in the confidentiality of his 
internal communications from his need to protect military and dip-
lomatic secrets, reasoning that production of communications of the 
former sort for in camera examination does not harm him in the way 
that production of the latter sort of communications does.138  In 2005, 
the Court cited Reynolds in unanimously reaffirming the Totten rule in 
the case of Tenet v. Doe.139  The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that Reynolds had replaced Totten, reasoning that Reynolds 
deals with a question of evidence while Totten calls for dismissal on 
the pleadings of certain claims that never even reach the issue of evi-
dence.140  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s treatment of Reynolds indicates 
that the Court does not see any issue as to its continuing viability.141
 135 Herring, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *6–7; FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 136 Herring, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at *19–21, 26–30, 37.  The court took the 
“mosaic” approach to the state secrets privilege described infra at notes 149–151 and 
accompanying text.  This formed part of the basis of the Third Circuit’s affirmance 
of the case.  See Herring, 424 F.3d at 391 n.3. 
 137 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 138 Id. at 706.  The Court, while not describing exactly how in camera inspection of 
purported state secrets would hurt the President, seemed to reach this conclusion on 
separation-of-powers grounds.  Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted 
that “[a]s to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the ut-
most deference to Presidential responsibilities.”  Id. at 710.  The Court then quoted C 
& S Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948): 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ 
for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are 
not and ought not to be published to the world.  It would be intoler-
able that courts, without the relevant information, should review and 
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly 
held secret. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710. 
 139 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 140 Id. at 9.  The Court described the Totten rule as “a rule designed not merely to 
defeat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry,” a threshold issue similar 
to the prudential standing doctrine.  Id. at 6. 
 141 Id. at 9 (discussing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)). 
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III.     LOWER COURTS’ HANDLING OF REYNOLDS AND  
PROPOSED RULE 509 
A. Scope of Privilege, Procedure, and Effects of a Successful Invocation 
Lower courts have done well in determining the scope of infor-
mation protected by the state secrets privilege.  They have struggled, 
however, in hammering out the proper procedures Reynolds requires 
and in judging just what a successful invocation of the privilege 
means to a case. 
In general, courts have taken an expansive view of what consti-
tutes a state secret.142  Taking their cue from the Supreme Court’s 
dicta in Nixon,143 lower courts have adopted the position that secrets 
relating to diplomatic relations, as well as military secrets, are pro-
tected by the state secrets privilege.144  Moreover, secrets having to do 
with intelligence-gathering techniques are protected.145  Thus, courts 
are in agreement that the government may assert a privilege over any 
evidence, the disclosure of which will injure national security. 
Courts vary as to the extent of judicial review they require when 
the privilege is invoked.  Some courts are quick to dismiss after a 
proper invocation,146 while others are more demanding of the Execu-
tive.147
 142 J. Steven Gardner, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: Proposal for 
Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 584–85 (1994).  An example of the privi-
lege’s seemingly endless expansion can be found in Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595 (3d 
Cir. 1990), where the Attorney General invoked the privilege to protect an FBI file 
maintained on a sixth grader who received mail from foreign countries as part of a 
school project.  Id. at 600. 
 143 Compare Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 710 (emphasizing the President’s need to pro-
tect military and diplomatic secrets) with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7, 10-11 (discussing 
the importance of protecting military secrets). 
 144 See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 145 See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms (“Halkin I”), 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 146 See Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995); Zuckerbraun v. 
General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547–48 (2d Cir. 1994); Bowles v. United 
States, 950 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 147 See, e.g., Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 59 (“When a litigant must lose if the claim is up-
held and the government’s assertions are dubious in view of the nature of the infor-
mation requested and the circumstances surrounding the case, careful in camera ex-
amination is not only appropriate, but obligatory.”) (citations omitted). 
[I]n situations in which close examination of the government’s asser-
tions is warranted, the trial judge should insist (1) that the formal 
claim of privilege be made on the public record and (2) that the gov-
ernment either (a) publicly explain in detail the kinds of injury to na-
tional security it seeks to avoid and the reason those harms would result 
from revelation of the requested information or (b) indicate why such 
an explanation would itself endanger national security . . . .  The gov-
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Often courts seem tentative in applying the standard of review 
announced in Reynolds—that the government must show “a reason-
able danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military mat-
ters which, in the interest of national security should not be di-
vulged.”148  They have taken what two commentators refer to as the 
“mosaic” approach to state secrets:149 out of fear of the impact of dis-
closure of even seemingly harmless, unclassified information, courts 
cite their own lack of expertise and defer to the Executive.150  These 
courts reason that enemy intelligence can synthesize seemingly be-
nign evidence and thus gain insight into the inner workings of the 
government.151
A successful invocation of the state secrets privilege removes the 
privileged evidence from a case, at which point any one of three 
things may happen.152  First, if a plaintiff cannot make out a prima fa-
cie case without the evidence, the case will be dismissed; otherwise it 
will continue.153  Second, if a defendant is deprived of evidence mate-
rial to his defense, summary judgment will be granted to the defen-
dant.154  Third, if the very subject matter of a case is privileged, then 
the case will be dismissed at the pleadings.155
Finally, one noteworthy aspect of lower courts’ handling of Rey-
nolds is their broad interpretation of the requirement that depart-
ment heads personally consider purportedly privileged materials.  
Courts have held that, in situations requiring personal consideration 
by department heads under Reynolds, executive officers may make 
ernment’s public statement need be no more (and no less) specific 
than is practicable under the circumstances. 
Id. at 63–64 (footnote omitted). 
 148 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 149 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 103–04. 
 150 See, e.g., Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8. 
It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign 
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin 
to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak 
and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous 
information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with star-
tling clarity how the unseen whole must operate. 
. . . .
. . . Courts should accord the "utmost deference" to executive asser-
tions of privilege upon grounds of military or diplomatic secrets. 
Id. at 8–9 (citations omitted). 
 151 Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8. 
 152 Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
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their determinations based on summaries or other reports made to 
them by subordinates.156
B. The Odyssey of Rule 509 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Advisory Committee for the 
Federal Rules of Evidence proposed thirteen privilege rules,157 one of 
which was Rule 509, which addressed the state secrets privilege.158  
The Committee sought to approximate the holding of Reynolds, 
though the drafting process reveals tinkering with the standard and 
procedures announced in that case.159
 156 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g de-
nied, No. 04-1349, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28951, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) (en 
banc); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
 157 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at 501–02. 
 158 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 225.  For a discussion of the trek of the 
original privilege rules through Congress and the ultimate adoption of Rule 501, see 
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, § 501[01]. 
 159 Proposed Rule 509 read in pertinent part: 
(a) Definitions. 
(1) Secret of state.— A “secret of state” is a governmental secret relat-
ing to the national defense or the international relations of the United 
States. 
(2) Official information.— “Official information” is information within 
the custody or control of a department or agency of the government 
the disclosure of which is shown to be contrary to the public interest 
and which consists of: (A) intragovernmental opinions or recommen-
dations submitted for consideration in the performance of decisional 
or policymaking functions, or (B) subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500, investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes and 
not otherwise available, or (C) information within the custody or con-
trol of a governmental department or agency whether initiated within 
the department or agency or acquired by it in its exercise of its official 
responsibilities and not otherwise available to the public pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 552. 
(b) General rule of privilege.— The government has a privilege to re-
fuse to give evidence and to prevent any person from giving evidence 
upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that the evidence 
will disclose a secret of state or official information, as defined in this 
rule. 
(c) Procedures.— The privilege for secrets of state may be claimed only 
by the chief officer of the government agency or department adminis-
tering the subject matter which the secret information sought con-
cerns, but the privilege for official information may be asserted by any 
attorney representing the government.  The required showing may be 
made in whole or in part in the form of a written statement.  The judge 
may hear the matter in chambers, but all counsel are entitled to inspect 
the claim and showing and to be heard thereon, except that, in the 
case of secrets of state, the judge upon motion of the government, may 
permit the government to make the required showing in the above 
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The preliminary draft of the Rule, released in 1969, called for 
the privilege to be effective where there was a substantial likelihood 
that “the evidence will disclose a secret of state.”160  The 1971 draft fea-
tured a shift in this standard, now calling for a reasonable likelihood 
that disclosure “will be detrimental or injurious to the national defense or the 
international relations of the United States.”161
The 1971 draft was at once more lenient and more exacting.  On 
the one hand, it lowered the likelihood of injury (from substantial to 
reasonable) that the government needed to demonstrate.  This sec-
ond draft, however, also raised the standard for the type of injury the 
government must demonstrate.  While originally the Advisory Com-
mittee called only for the government to raise the specter of the dis-
closure of a state secret,162 the second draft stipulated an executive of-
ficer must raise the alarm of injury to national defense or 
international relations.163
The difference may be demonstrated by reference to Halkin v. 
Helms (“Halkin I”).164  In Halkin I,  the plaintiffs argued that the state 
form in camera.  If the judge sustains the privilege upon a showing in 
camera, the entire text of the government’s statements shall be sealed 
and preserved in the court’s records in the event of appeal.  In the case 
of privilege claimed for official information the court may require ex-
amination in camera of the information itself.  The judge may take any 
protective measure which the interests of the government and the fur-
therance of justice may require. 
(d) Notice to government.— If the circumstances of the case indicate a 
substantial possibility that a claim of privilege would be appropriate but 
has not been made because of oversight or lack of knowledge, the 
judge shall give or cause notice to be given to the officer entitled to 
claim the privilege and shall stay further proceedings a reasonable time 
to afford opportunity to assert a claim of privilege. 
(e) Effect of sustaining claim.— If a claim of privilege is sustained in a 
proceeding to which the government is a party and it appears that an-
other party is thereby deprived of material evidence, the judge shall 
make any further orders which the interests of justice require, includ-
ing striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding 
against the government upon an issue as to which the evidence is rele-
vant, or dismissing the action. 
FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973), reprinted in 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra 
note 19, § 509-1-2. 
 160 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1969) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9. 
 161 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1971) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9. 
 162 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1969) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9. 
 163 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1971) (emphasis added); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-9. 
 164 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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secrets privilege should not protect, without more, the mere fact that 
the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted their private com-
munications.165  Under the 1971 version of Rule 509, the danger that 
the secret of the interceptions would be revealed would not have been 
enough.  The government would have had to demonstrate a reason-
able likelihood that disclosure of that fact would harm national secu-
rity. 
The Justice Department was not pleased with this develop-
ment.166  It responded by proposing its own draft which, of course, 
called for a lower standard.167  That proposed draft even went so far as 
to call for the classification of a document to be “conclusive on the 
issue of state secrets.”168
The Advisory Committee adopted many of the Justice Depart-
ment’s suggestions in the final draft of Rule 509, which the Supreme 
Court transmitted in 1973.169  In fact, both components of the stan-
dard in issue—the degree of injury and the sort of injury—were low-
ered.170
Rule 509(a)(1) defined a “secret of state” as “a governmental se-
cret relating to the national defense or the international relations of 
the United States.”171  Subsection (b) set out the government’s powers 
in asserting the privilege and the standard of review: “The govern-
ment has a privilege to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any 
person from giving evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of 
danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of state or official informa-
tion, as defined in this rule.”172  As described above, this was the dou-
ble-lowering of the state secrets standard, combining the most lenient 
of the 1969 and 1971 standards.173  This language more closely 
tracked the standard announced in Reynolds, which held that a show-
 165 Id. at 8.  The court rejected this argument.  Id. at 8–9. 
 166 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 945–46.  The Justice Department ob-
jected to Proposed Rule 509 in part because it considered the standard of review 
governing state secrets claims— a reasonable likelihood of danger that disclosure will 
be detrimental to national defense or international relations—too demanding of the 
government.  It also objected because the Advisory Committee had denied it a much-
coveted official information privilege.  Id. 
 167 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, § 509-11-12. 
 168 Id. 
 169 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 949–51. 
 170 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at § 509-13. 
 171 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973). 
 172 Id. (emphases added). 
 173 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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ing of a “reasonable danger” of the exposure of “military matters” was 
sufficient.174
Subsection (c) modified the Reynolds procedures.  The Rule 
lightened the requirement that only a department head may invoke 
the state secrets privilege by giving agency heads the same author-
ity.175  Gone was the stipulation that an officer must personally con-
sider the purportedly privileged materials.176  Officers claiming the 
privilege were permitted to make their showing in the form of a writ-
ten statement.177  The judge and counsel were free to inspect this 
showing and whatever else the government submitted, unless the 
government successfully moved for in camera inspection.178  The judge 
was free to take whatever protective measures were necessary.179
The Committee likely made these changes in order to allow 
more play in the joints, that is, to approximate the workings of mod-
ern government.  It seems counter-productive to require a Cabinet-
level officer, or an agency head for that matter, to inspect documents 
that may number in the thousands in order to prevail in asserting the 
state secrets privilege.180
The Advisory Committee set out an interesting new requirement 
in subsection (d).  The Rule mandated that 
[i]f the circumstances of the case indicate a substantial possibility 
that a claim of privilege would be appropriate but has not been 
made because of oversight or lack of knowledge, the judge shall 
give or cause notice to be given to the officer entitled to claim the 
privilege and shall stay further proceedings a reasonable time to 
afford opportunity to assert a claim of privilege.181
Proposed Rule 509 imposed a requirement on judges to apprise 
the Executive of possible disclosure of a state secret.182  This is notable 
 174 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
 175 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973). 
 176 See id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g 
denied, No. 04-1349, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28951, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) (en 
banc); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
 181 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973). 
 182 This requirement forms part of this Comment’s proposal set forth infra in Part 
V.  The proposal also features a corresponding duty on the part of either the court or 
the Executive to transmit purportedly privileged materials to ranking members of 
Congress with security clearances where the privilege is invoked in a national security 
whistleblower case.  See Infra Part V. 
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given the line of reasoning in state secrets jurisprudence that judges 
are ill-equipped to make such determinations concerning national 
security.183  Suddenly judges were required to referee, in an area in 
which they were presumed to be unqualified, in order to broaden the 
net of privilege claims. 
Subsection (e) set out the effects of a successful invocation.184  In 
a case in which the government was a party and properly invoked the 
privilege, if the other party was deprived of material evidence, the 
judge was free to take measures as justice required, “including strik-
ing the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial, finding against the 
government upon an issue as to which the evidence is relevant, or 
dismissing the action.”185  The Rule was silent on what a judge may do 
where the government intervened as a third party.186
Rule 509 suffered from a tragedy of timing.  Though passage of 
rules of evidence is ordinarily mundane fare for Congress, the Su-
preme Court transmitted the Federal Rules just as the Watergate 
Scandal was exploding.187  Suddenly Congress was faced with pro-
posed codification of the state secrets and official information privi-
leges at a time when it was headed for a showdown with the President 
over the withholding of information.  The privilege rules ignited a 
debate that held up passage of the Federal Rules for two years.188
Ultimately Rule 509, along with all of the privilege rules, was 
voted down.189  Congress, hostile overall to the codification of privi-
leges, opted for a catch-all Rule 501, which provides, inter alia, that 
the rules of privilege in the federal courts are to be governed by the 
common law.190
What would have been the effect of Rule 509?  It has been ar-
gued that while the Rule would have promoted “the broadest possible 
reading of Reynolds,” the firestorm of criticism that attended its pro-
posal was unfair.191  Moreover, two commentators contend that Rule 
 183 See, e.g., Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 184 FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973). 
 185 Id.  The approach of finding against the government on an issue in which it 
invokes the privilege conflicts with the approach lower courts have taken.  See supra 
notes 152–55 and accompanying text.  This is precisely what the lower court did in 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953). 
 186 See FED. R. EVID. 509 (Proposed Draft 1973). 
 187 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at 509-3. 
 188 Id. (“[N]o single rule promulgated by the Supreme Court provoked as strong a 
reaction– almost all of it negative– as did Rule 509.”). 
 189 Id. at 501-2–3. 
 190 See FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 191 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, at 956. 
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509 left ambiguous the same things that Reynolds left ambiguous: the 
role of in camera inspection, the scope of the privilege, and the de-
gree of deference due the Executive.192  The procedural modifica-
tions were minor, though excising the requirement that department 
or agency heads personally consider purportedly privileged materials 
essentially guaranteed that anonymous underlings would make se-
crecy determinations.  One major change was the obligation imposed 
on trial judges to provide notice to the government where there was a 
substantial possibility a state secret might be disclosed, a requirement 
which certainly would have broadened use of the privilege. 
The lesson to be learned from the rise and fall of Rule 509 is 
that Congress can exercise a negative power to strike down an effort 
to officially enshrine government secrecy privileges.  Whether or not 
it will exercise an active power to reform the state secrets privilege 
remains to be seen.  It is certainly within Congress’ purview to do 
so,193 and this Comment urges that it take exactly this course of ac-
tion. 
C. Types of State Secrets Cases 
Litigants have invoked the state secrets privilege in commercial 
disputes, often with the government intervening as a third party.  
These cases typically involve defense contracts or intellectual property 
issues.194
 192 Id. 
 193 For an example of Congress’ exercise of this active power, see FED. R. EVID. 
413–15 (setting out rules governing admissibility of similar crimes and acts in sex of-
fense cases). 
 194 See Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262–63 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
reh’g denied, No. 04-1349, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28951, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) 
(en banc) (misappropriation of trade secret claim related to underwater fiber optic 
cable technology); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1021–
22 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (breach of contract action over stealth bomber); DTM Research, 
L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2001) (trade secret claim over 
telecommunications technology); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 
F.2d 395, 397–98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defense contractor sued military contractor); Clift 
v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 827–28 (2d Cir. 1979) (Invention Secrecy Act action); 
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958) (Invention Secrecy Act ac-
tion); Virtual Defs. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 9, 23 
(D.D.C. 2000), appeal dismissed, No. 00-5427, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7468 (D.C. Cir. 
Mar. 15, 2001) (defense contractor claimed it was entitled to sales commission on 
sale of Mig-29s); Foster v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 492, 493 (Cl. Ct. 1987) (Invention 
Secrecy Act claim); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 159 (Cl. Ct. 
1983) (same); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 
(patent infringement); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 
354 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (patent action over weapons). 
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Two narrow areas in which the government has invoked the 
privilege are employment discrimination cases and cases concerning 
intelligence relationships.  In some cases, the Executive has claimed 
state secrets privilege where agents of certain federal agencies alleged 
discrimination in their line of work.195  In other cases, involving intel-
ligence matters, the privilege has been invoked, though resort to the 
Totten rule may have been more appropriate.196
Beginning in the 1970’s, two rather disturbing strains of state se-
crets cases emerged.  The first is a group of cases in which plaintiffs 
alleged the government violated their constitutional rights through 
warrantless surveillance and other harassment.  The second is a col-
lection of cases in which plaintiffs alleged the government had 
knowledge of certain sordid activities. 
The surveillance cases, mostly litigated in the 1970s and 1980s, 
dealt with some fairly high profile matters.197  Daniel Ellsberg, who 
leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press,198 sued the government, al-
leging that the Nixon administration targeted him for warrantless 
surveillance out of reprisal.199  A group of plaintiffs who were involved 
 195 Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341–42 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
1052 (2006); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  In Sterling’s appel-
late brief, counsel set forth a rather searing condemnation of the state secrets privi-
lege: 
The government’s increased use of secrecy as a sword rather than a 
shield has reached endemic proportions . . . .  The Executive Branch, 
and in particular the CIA, appears blinded by an ambition to weaken 
the historical notion of separation of powers by attacking the courts’ 
ability to adjudicate judicial matters, both civil and criminal, that may 
encroach upon national security information.  That must now stop. 
Appellant’s Brief at 11, Sterling, 416 F.3d 338 (footnote omitted), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/sterling1204.pdf.  The court in Sterling partially based 
its decision on the threat of “graymail,” a process by which a plaintiff brings an action 
against an agency with the intention of getting the agency to settle out of fear of re-
vealing classified information.  Sterling, 416 F.3d at 344. 
 196 Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1238–39 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(plaintiff sued Penthouse for libel after it printed a story linking him to CIA plans to 
weaponize marine mammals); Maxwell v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 143 F.R.D. 590, 
593–94 (D. Md. 1991) (plaintiff bank employee alleged life became “intolerable” af-
ter he learned a customer was really a front for a CIA money laundering operation); 
Heine v. Raus, 305 F. Supp. 816, 816–17 (D. Md. 1969) (plaintiff sued after defen-
dant “outed” him as Soviet intelligence). 
 197 The issue of warrantless domestic spying again rose to the forefront with the 
revelation that the Bush administration green-lighted such spying by the National 
Security Agency after the September 11 attacks.  James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush 
Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 198 Daniel Ellsberg, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Ellsberg (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
 199 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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in anti-Vietnam war organizations sued various agencies and officials, 
including CIA Directors Helms and Colby, alleging warrantless sur-
veillance.200  The ACLU followed, claiming that the military spied on 
civilians domestically.201  Moreover, the government was sued over the 
now-infamous COINTELPRO FBI program.202
Another group of cases involved plaintiffs alleging government 
knowledge of illicit activity as support for their various causes of ac-
tion.203  An airline suing an insurance company after terrorists de-
stroyed a plane sought to compel production of CIA documents con-
firming that Arab governments paid the terrorist group 
responsible.204  Relatives of the deceased sued the government over 
the downing of an Iranian commercial aircraft by a Navy missile.205  
Parents sued suspected Contra operatives for the wrongful death of 
their son, who was tortured and murdered while working in Nicara-
gua; they subpoenaed two federal agencies for documents concern-
ing the activities of the Contras at the time of the murder.206
In almost all of the cases noted above, the government invoked 
the state secrets privilege and prevailed.207  Though some courts were 
 200 Halkin v. Helms (“Halkin I”), 598 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Halkin v. Helms 
(“Halkin II”), 690 F.2d 977, 980–81 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 201 ACLU v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 
 202 In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  For a discussion of the 
COINTELPRO program, the objective of which was to neutralize leftist groups 
through infiltration and smear campaigns from 1956 to 1971, see generally Going 
Undercover/Criminalizing Dissent?, NOW WITH BILL MOYERS, March 5, 2004, 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/cointelpro.html; Paul Wolf, COINTELPRO 
,http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/cointel.htm (last visited  Sept. 3, 2006).  
Actress Jean Seberg, one of many celebrity targets of the program, blamed the mis-
carriage of her child on FBI harassment and ultimately committed suicide in 1979.  
Jean Seberg: Politics, http://www.saintjean.co.uk/politics.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 
2006).  For copies of COINTELPRO documents relating to Seberg and an account of 
her time targeted by the program, see id. 
 203 Certain aspects of the Edmonds case fall into this category.  See Infra Part V.C. 
 204 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 
1100–01, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 205 Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 754 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
 206 Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314, 316 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 251 
F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 207 In re United States, 872 F.2d at 481; Halkin v. Helms (“Halkin II”), 690 F.2d 977, 
1001, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (partially basing its decision on the “constitutional re-
quirement” that the needs of the litigant yield to the public interest); Halkin v. 
Helms (“Halkin I”), 598 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 
59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the district court’s blocking discovery based on the 
privilege was correct “for the most part”); Linder, 183 F.R.D. at 325; Nejad, 724 F. 
Supp. at 756; Pan Am. World Airways, 368 F. Supp. at 1140–41.  The court in Brown 
remanded to the district court for a determination as to the privilege where there 
was a new trial judge on the case.  ACLU v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 
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more demanding than others, the end result was that each of these 
potentially explosive cases was stalled, halted, or outright dismissed. 
These cases presented a challenge to the Reynolds framework.  
The surveillance cases, in particular, moved state secrets case law out 
of the black-and-white workability of Reynolds itself and commercial 
litigation cases, and confronted courts with the likelihood that victims 
of egregious constitutional violations were remediless.  For the first 
time the possibility of bad faith in invoking the privilege crept into 
the picture—the possibility that government officials, tangled in alle-
gations of mass invasions of privacy and political intimidation, were 
crouching behind the shield of the state secrets privilege.208  In fact, 
the D.C. Circuit found an overreach in Ellsberg v. Mitchell when the 
government claimed it need not produce the names of the Attorneys 
General who authorized the allegedly unconstitutional surveillance.209  
The panel, unimpressed by the conjurations of broad national secu-
rity interests, ordered the names be produced.210
Bound by Supreme Court precedent, the most courts could do 
in these cases was wring their hands at the mass of alleged potential 
violations that were going by the boards.211  Reynolds, with its holding 
that the interests of a private litigant can never outweigh the properly 
asserted interests of the government,212 forbade them from even con-
sidering that the interests of the plaintiffs in the surveillance cases 
approached those of the government.  Yet, it can be argued that 
these plaintiffs invoked interests that equaled, or even outweighed, 
the potential harm to national security that the government decried.  
1980) (en banc).  The court in Nat’l Lawyers Guild set out procedures to be followed 
in claiming the privilege.  Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 403 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 208 The Ellsberg affair was a prominent part of the most notorious cover-up in 
modern U.S. politics, Watergate, as the first operation of the so-called “Plumbers” 
was breaking into Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office.  White House Plumbers, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_House_Plumbers (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
 209 Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 60. 
 210 Id. (“We cannot see, and the government does not even purport to explain, 
how any further disruption of diplomatic relations or undesirable education of hos-
tile intelligence analysts would result from naming the responsible officials.”).  White 
House counsel Charles Colson served time in prison for obstruction of justice in the 
Ellsberg affair.  Revisiting Watergate: Key Players: Charles Colson, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/watergate/charles.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 22, 2006). 
 211 See In re United States, 872 F.2d at 477 (calling denial of a forum without allow-
ing a plaintiff a day in court “draconian”); Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 1001 (stating that 
only Congress could provide relief to parties alleging injury from the government 
“pursuing the ends of state”). 
 212 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
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If correct in their allegations, they were standing up against threats to 
the Bill of Rights and supplying the political process with subjects for 
discourse.  Yet, in the ultimate evaluation the plaintiffs alleged no 
government wrongdoing that directly threatened national security. 
In the post-September 11th world, courts must grapple with in-
vocations of the privilege in the context of two new areas: the war on 
terror and the phenomenon of national security whistleblowers. 
Perhaps most notably, the government has invoked the state se-
crets privilege in a number of cases in which the plaintiffs have al-
leged they were the targets of warrantless electronic surveillance initi-
ated by the National Security Agency.213  Moreover, the suit of Khalid 
El-Masri, a German citizen who alleges he was abducted and “ren-
dered” to Afghanistan for four months of torture, ran into the 
buzzsaw of the privilege.214  The Global Relief Fund, a charity that 
 213 The plaintiffs in the respective cases challenged the constitutionality of the so-
called “terrorist surveillance program,” which the New York Times reported President 
Bush authorized by secret order, a fact which the President himself confirmed in a 
radio address.  James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Kelli Arena, Bush Says He Signed NSA  
Wiretap Order, CNN.COM, Dec. 17, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ 
POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa.  The government invoked the privilege as an intervenor 
in two of the reported cases and as a party defendant in the third.  ACLU v. 
NSA/Cent. Sec. Serv., No. 06-CV-10204, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57338, at *5 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 17, 2006) (party defendant); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., No. 06 C 2837, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50812, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2006) (intervenor); Hepting v. AT&T 
Corp., No. C-06-672 VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49955, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 
2006) (intervenor).  The courts upheld the privilege as to those alleged aspects of 
the program which were not made public, including alleged tracking of the phone 
records of millions of Americans, but denied it as to the aspect which the govern-
ment publicly disclosed, monitoring communications between suspected al Qaeda 
members based in America and their cohorts abroad.  See ACLU, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57338 at *24—25; Terkel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50812, at *49–52; Hepting, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49955 at *58–62.  In the ACLU case, Judge Diggs Taylor or-
dered an injunction against the publicly disclosed aspect of the program, reasoning 
that “the public interest is clear, in this matter.  It is the upholding of our Constitu-
tion.”  ACLU, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57338 at *79. 
 214 El-Masri v. Tenet, No 1:05cv1417, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34577, at *2–7 (allega-
tions), 17–25 (discussion of the privilege); see also Declaration of James P. Comey, 
Deputy Attorney General, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 
04-CV-0249-DGT), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/arar-notice-011805.pdf 
(invocation of the privilege in reply to another rendition/torture case).  The court in 
Arar held the government’s state secrets claim was moot, as there were other grounds 
for dismissal.  Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287.  For a discussion of the Arar case and the 
secret “extraordinary rendition” program, see Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.  It has recently been revealed that a key feature of the 
program is a network of secret prisons which the United States maintains in Eastern 
Europe and Asia.  Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Grow-
ing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set up After 9/11, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01. 
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sued after the government allegedly conducted warrantless searches 
and froze its assets, met the same fate.215  Sibel Edmonds leads the 
charge of national security whistleblowers, but remains the only such 
plaintiff to encounter the state secrets privilege.  Other whistleblow-
ers include: Coleen Rowley, one of Time magazine’s 2002 Persons of 
the Year,216 who blasted the FBI for throwing up roadblocks in the in-
vestigation of Zacarias Moussaoui;217 Bogdan Dzakovic, a member of 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) “Red Team” who told the 
September 11 Commission that the FAA knew before September 11th 
that the nation’s commercial airplanes were vulnerable to hijack-
ings;218 Robert Wright, who alleged FBI intelligence agents thwarted 
counterterrorism investigations in order to protect their sources;219 
John Vincent, an FBI agent who sued the Bureau after it forbade him 
to talk to New York Times reporter Judith Miller about a bungled ter-
rorism investigation;220 Diane Kleiman, who alleges rampant corrup-
tion in the U.S. Customs Service and is suing for wrongful termina-
tion;221 and Russ Tice, an NSA analyst who was fired after going to 
Capitol Hill with allegations that a Chinese spy worked with him at his 
former post at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).222
Courts and commentators may shuffle the Arar, Global Relief 
Fund, and no-fly list cases into the same category as the surveillance 
cases (even though Arar alleges he was tortured in Syria!).  The Ed-
 215 Global Relief Fund, Inc. v. O’Neill, 205 F. Supp. 2d 885, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 216 Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, The Special Agent, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 
2003, at 34. 
 217 See Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case: The Inside 
Story of the FBI Whistle-Blower Who Accuses Her Bosses of Ignoring Warnings of 9/11.  A 
Reading of Her Entire Memo Suggests a Bracing Blueprint for Change, TIME, June 3, 2002, at 
24. 
 218 See Bogdan Dzakovic, Statement to the National Commission on  
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (May 22, 2003), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/ 
030522-dzakovic.htm.  Dzakovic also claims the FAA received a report on September 
11 that one of the planes was hijacked with a firearm.  Id. 
 219 Press Release, Judicial Watch, FBI Agent Robert Wright Says FBI Agents As-
signed to Intelligence Operations Continue to Protect Terrorists from Criminal In-
vestigations and Prosecutions (Sept. 11, 2002), http://www.judicialwatch.org/ 
printer_2469.shtml. 
 220 See Complaint, Vincent v. FBI, No. 03-0226 (GK) (D.D.C. June 17, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/110/complaint.htm. 
 221 Customs Coverup, http://www.customscoverup.com (last visited Aug. 28, 
2006); Craig Horowitz, An Inconvenient Woman, NEW YORK, June 2, 2003, available at 
http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/crimelaw/n_8740/. 
 222 James Ridgeway, Intelligence Whistleblower Canned, VILLAGE VOICE, May 4, 2005, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0519,webmondo1,63748,6.html; 
Rose, supra note 2, at 280. 
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monds case and the particular brand of national security whistleblower 
litigation that may follow, however, pose a unique challenge to the 
viability of the Reynolds framework. 
More than any other type of state secrets case, a national security 
whistleblower case carries the possibility that the public interest in 
disclosure, or at least allowing a case to go forward with judicial con-
trols, outweighs the interest in secrecy.  After all, in such a case a 
plaintiff necessarily alleges government wrongdoing (either malfea-
sance or nonfeasance) that threatened or is threatening national se-
curity.223  On the one hand the government may argue that military 
or diplomatic secrets are at stake, but on the other hand are allega-
tions that espionage rings and organized crime have infiltrated the 
FBI,224 that terrorist investigations have been diverted,225 that massive 
amounts of cocaine have been smuggled into the U.S. through cor-
ruption,226 and that foreign intelligence operates at the DIA.227  Dis-
missing these cases may protect some aspects of national security, but 
leave others extremely vulnerable. 
IV.     EDMONDS V. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE228
A. Facts 
Sibel Edmonds answered a call from the FBI, the week after the 
September 11th attacks, to join the War on Terror as a contract lin-
guist.229  In time she found herself waging another war. 
Edmonds was born in Turkey, raised in Iran, and attended col-
lege in the United States, where she has lived ever since.230  She 
 223 See supra notes 26, 216–222, and discussion of Edmonds case infra at Part V.A. 
 224 See supra note 8; infra at Part V-A. 
 225 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 226 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 227 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 228 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F. 
App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005). 
 229 See Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 10, at 3.  The 2005 complaint 
(setting out Edmonds’ FTCA action against the federal government) arises from the 
same set of facts underlying Edmonds’ suit under the Privacy Act, Administrative 
Procedures Act, and First and Fifth Amendments, but is more specific than its prede-
cessor.  Compare Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8 with Edmonds 2002 Com-
plaint, supra note 7. 
 230 Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 8, at 2; Rose, supra note 2, at 266–
67. 
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speaks Turkish, Farsi, Azerbaijani, and English.231  She does not speak 
Arabic.232
Under constraint of gag orders,233 Edmonds alleges that as a con-
tract linguist she was responsible for translating documents from the 
target language into English, and occasionally the other way 
around.234  In her position she allegedly observed that a fellow trans-
lator in her department, Melek Can Dickerson, had improper con-
tacts with subjects of FBI investigations.235  Dickerson, according to 
Edmonds, translated wiretaps of these subjects and leaked informa-
tion to them.236  Moreover, she instructed Edmonds not to translate 
certain documents because she said she knew the subjects, and the 
documents did not contain any pertinent information.237  As a result, 
documents and wiretaps relating to counterintelligence and counter-
terrorism investigations were mistranslated and distorted, throwing 
off the investigations.238  Furthermore, work order documents related 
to the September 11th investigation were falsified and Edmonds’ sig-
nature was forged on them.239  Edmonds alleges that when she ob-
jected to these practices, Dickerson first attempted to bribe her240 and 
then threatened her.241
 231 Horton, supra note 5.  Edmonds’ FTCA complaint presents this by stating, 
“[p]ublished media reports have stated that she is fluent in Turkish and Farsi, and 
conversational in Azerbaijani.”  Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 7, at 2. 
 232 Horton, supra note 5. 
 233 See Horton, supra note 5. 
 234 Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 11, at 3. 
 235 Id. ¶ 17, at 4. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 5. 
 239 Id.  For Edmonds’ description to September 11 Commissioner Thomas Kean 
of Dickerson’s actions and their repercussions, see Letter from Sibel Edmonds to 
Thomas Kean, Chairman, Nat’l Comm. on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S.  
(Aug. 1, 2004), at 1–3 [hereinafter Kean Letter], http://www.justacitizen.com/ 
articles_documents/Letter_to_Kean.pdf.  In the letter Edmonds claims  
that “Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation left the United States in  
2002 . . . .”  Id. at 3. 
 240 Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 18, at 5–6.  Allegedly Dickerson and 
her husband, who had worked for years as a military attaché in Ankara, paid a sur-
prise visit to Edmonds and her husband at their home.  Id.  The couple encouraged 
them to join the American-Turkish Council, a prestigious and lucrative organization, 
and intimated that all they would have to do to get in was tell the group Edmonds 
worked for the FBI.  Id. 
 241 Rose, supra note 2, at 273.  Edmonds claims that about a month after the sur-
prise visit, Dickerson told her she was endangering her family in Turkey.  Id. (“Ac-
cording to Edmonds, [Dickerson said,] ‘Why are you doing this, Sibel?  Why don’t 
you just drop it?  You know there could be serious consequences.  Why put your fam-
ily in Turkey in danger over this?’”).  Edmonds alleges her sister fled Turkey for the 
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Edmonds has hinted that she witnessed even more sordid prac-
tices during her time as a contract linguist, though apparently gag 
orders keep her from elaborating.242  Reportedly, she alleged to her 
superiors that the translation department was covering up evidence 
that foreign nationals had paid a State Department staffer in ex-
change for secrets, negotiated with a Pentagon official over weapons 
procurement, discussed installation of spies at research facilities in 
order to gain information regarding black-market nuclear weapons, 
and referred in recordings to drug operations and money launder-
ing.243  Moreover, one author claims Edmonds listened to phone calls 
in which targets spoke of attempting to bribe members of Congress of 
both parties.244
United States in early 2002 after Sibel warned her she was in danger.  Edmonds 2005 
Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 24, at 8.  Edmonds further charges that beginning in late 
2002, Turkish newspapers began running stories labeling her a spy and an enemy of 
the Turkish state.  Id. ¶¶ 55–63, at 14–16. 
 242 Rose, supra note 2, at 271–73, 280–81.  Reporter David Rose apparently ob-
tained information on the case from congressional staffers present during both Ed-
monds’ testimony and the FBI briefings at the secure Sensitive Compartmented In-
formation facility.  Id. (quoting congressional staffers).  Edmonds says she is sure the 
staffers based their tips “on the wiretap recordings they heard and the documents 
[provided at the testimony and briefings].”  Horton, supra note 5. 
 243 Rose, supra note 2, at 272.  Reportedly Edmonds translated documents and 
wiretaps relevant to an FBI investigation of Turkish nationals, particularly members 
of the American-Turkish Council (hereinafter “ATC”) and targets inside the Turkish 
embassy in Washington.  Id.; Horton, supra note 5.  During the course of the investi-
gations a special agent who had already formed his own suspicions about Dickerson 
directed Edmonds to go back and translate wiretaps which Dickerson had marked as 
“not pertinent.”  When Edmonds did so, according to Rose, she found information 
relating to the secret payments and negotiations mentioned above.  Rose, supra note 
2, at 272; Horton, supra note 5. 
 244 Rose, supra note 2, at 281.  In particular, the targets allegedly boasted about 
making an illegal contribution of $500,000 to House Speaker Dennis Hastert in 2000 
in order to get him to pull a resolution from the House floor which would have con-
demned Turkey for its alleged genocide of the Armenians.  Id. at 281–82; Horton, 
supra note 5.  Supposedly there was an effort within the FBI to have a special prose-
cutor appointed to investigate the dealings with politicians, but nothing ever came 
about, though the Campaign for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington has filed a 
complaint requesting an investigation under federal election law as to whether 
Hastert accepted illegal foreign funds. Rose, supra note 2, at 281; Campaign for Re-
sponsibility and Ethics in Washington, CREW Files FEC Complaint Requesting Inves-
tigation into Foreign Donations to Rep. Dennis Hastert’s Campaign (Aug. 16, 2005), 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/activities/campaign.php?view=80.  As for the reso-
lution supposedly pulled from the floor in 2000, the House International Relations 
Committee passed two such resolutions in October 2005 condemning the Armenian 
genocide.  H.R. Res. 316, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Con. Res. 195, 109th Cong. 
(2005); see also Press Release, Armenian National Committee of America, House In-
ternational Relations Committee Overwhelmingly Adopts Armenian Genocide  
Legislation (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.anca.org/press_releases/ 
press_releases.php?prid=813.  As it happens, ATC Chairman Scowcroft wrote Hastert 
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The specifics of Edmonds’ journey through the official channels 
of the FBI and Department of Justice are mostly undisputed.  Starting 
in January 2002, she told her story to the Supervisory Language Spe-
cialist, the Acting Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), the FBI 
Security Office, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism 
and Counterintelligence, the Deputy Assistant Director for Counter-
terrorism and Counterintelligence, the FBI Office of Professional Re-
sponsibility (OPR), and the Department of Justice Office of the In-
spector General (OIG).245
The efforts were unavailing.  Edmonds underwent a polygraph 
examination administered to determine if she had made unauthor-
ized disclosures of information outside the Bureau, and passed.246  
Otherwise nothing came of her allegations.247
In March 2002, with her complaints to the OPR and OIG still 
pending, Edmonds was terminated.248  She claims that she was threat-
ened with imprisonment as she was getting fired and that her superi-
ors told her the OPR and OIG would never take her case.249  More-
over, she alleges that a month later the Turkish security service 
executed a warrant at the home of her sister, who had already fled 
the country.250
a letter in September 2005 urging him to oppose the resolutions.  Letter from Brent 
Scowcroft, Chairman, American-Turkish Council, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.anca.org/press_releases/ 
press_releases.php?prid=810. 
 245 Edmonds 2005 Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 21, 23, 25, 30–31, at 6–9. 
 246 Id. ¶ 33, at 8–9. 
 247 Id. ¶ 17, at 5 (“FBI management failed to take corrective response to [Ed-
monds’] reports and serious concerns . . . .”). 
 248 See id. ¶ 38 at 10–11. 
 249 Id. ¶ 38 at 11.  Specifically, Edmonds alleges Supervisory Special Agent Tom 
Frields told her, in response to her vow that she’d see him again, “I will see you in 
jail.”  Id.  Moreover, she claims that, after she mentioned the pending investigations, 
Frields told her, “[w]e have already called them.  OIG and OPR are not willing to 
take your case and have told us that there will not be any investigation.”  Edmonds, 
2005 Complaint, supra note 8, at 11. 
 250 Id. ¶ 41, at 12.  Supposedly the warrant read, “[f]or an important issue your 
deposition/interrogation is required. If you do not report to the station within 5 
days, between 09:00 and 17:00, as is required by Turkish law CMK.132, you will be 
taken/arrested by force.”  Rose, supra note 2, at 279.  Edmonds later forwarded 
through counsel a copy of the warrant to FBI Director Mueller and Attorney General 
Ashcroft, along with a statement that she and her family were in danger.  Edmonds 
2005 Complaint ¶ 43, at 12. 
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Edmonds soon attracted the attention of Senators Grassley and 
Leahy, who expressed their concerns to Attorney General Ashcroft.251  
Over the next few years she gave testimony in a “secure Sensitive 
Compartmented Information facility” to congressional staffers, OIG 
investigators, and September 11 Commission staffers.252  Moreover, 
the FBI provided briefings to the same parties in the same facility.253
B. Edmonds battles the state secrets privilege and classifications 
Edmonds filed suit in the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia on July 22, 2002,254 alleging violations of the Privacy Act,255 
Administrative Procedure Act,256 and First and Fifth Amendments of 
the U.S. Constitution.257  On October 18, 2002 Attorney General 
Ashcroft invoked the state secrets privilege,258 touching off a battle of 
transparency versus secrecy that spilled onto other fronts. 
In April 2004, Ashcroft intervened in a case filed by certain Sep-
tember 11 families against Saudi Arabia and certain Saudi companies, 
just as the plaintiffs were about to depose Edmonds, invoking the 
privilege and moving the court to quash the deposition.259  Later, in 
May 2004, Ashcroft retroactively classified all Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee materials on Edmonds, including information on Leahy’s and 
Grassley’s websites, an unprecedented move.260
 251 See Letter from U.S. Senators Charles E. Grassley and Patrick J. Leahy to John 
Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.justacitizen.com/ 
articles_documents/Leahy_Grassley_Letter_to_Ashcroft_8-13-04.pdf. 
 252 Rose, supra note 2, at 266. 
 253 Id. at 271. 
 254 Edmonds 2002 Complaint, supra note 7. 
 255 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 256 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2000). 
 257 Edmonds 2002 Complaint, supra note 7.  Edmonds sued for damages, rein-
statement to her job, an order prohibiting the FBI from retaliating against her or her 
family, and other injunctive relief.  Id.  Edmonds also filed a suit against the FBI un-
der the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).  The court granted 
summary judgment for the government on all but two of its claims of exemption 
from providing documents.  Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 258 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 161 F. 
App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S, Ct. 734 (2005).  The government also 
moved to dismiss.  Id. at 68. 
 259 Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82, 82 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 260 Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1.  The Justice Department 
backed off of this position after the Project on Government Oversight filed suit.  
Press Release, Project on Government Oversight, Justice Department Caves in: Allows 
Publication of Retroactively Classified Information (Feb. 22, 2005), 
http://www.pogo.org/p/government/ga-050202-classification.html. 
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In July 2004, District Judge Walton261 upheld both the invocation 
of the privilege in the Edmonds case262 and the motion to quash the 
deposition in the Burnett case.263  Edmonds had  challenged the gov-
ernment’s invocation of the privilege in her case on the grounds that 
Ashcroft did not personally consider the purportedly privileged ma-
terials264 and was not specific as to what should be privileged.265  The 
court rejected these arguments, first holding that the Attorney Gen-
eral met the personal consideration requirement.266  Relying on Kasza 
v. Browner,267 the court reasoned that Ashcroft had expressed a level 
of consideration similar to that of the Secretary of the Air Force in 
that case,268 and the deputy director of the FBI supported his declara-
tion.269  Turning to the specificity argument, the court stated that af-
ter reviewing several classified declarations in camera, it was satisfied 
that Ashcroft had met this obligation.270  Judge Walton, however, 
added that he was unable to explain the basis of his decision, given 
secrecy concerns.271  Finally, the court held the case should be dis-
missed, reasoning that Edmonds would not be able to support any of 
her claims.272  The court based its decision on further classified decla-
 261 Judge Walton is currently presiding over the criminal case against I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby, former Chief of Staff for Vice President Cheney, who was indicted in 
October 2005 on charges of obstruction of justice, perjury, and making false state-
ments.  Kelli Arena et al., Cheney’s Top Aide Indicted; CIA Leak Probe Continues, 
CNN.COM, Oct. 29, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/28/leak.probe/ 
index.html. 
 262 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 73, 77. 
 263 Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 84.  The court granted the motion in part and de-
nied it in part.  Id. 
 264 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
 265 Id. at 75. 
 266 Id. 
 267 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 268 Id. at 1168 (setting out statement of the Secretary of the Air Force). 
 269 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 75. 
 270 Id. at 76. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at 79–82.  Citing Kasza, the court set out three possible outcomes where the 
state secrets privilege is successfully invoked: 
First, by invoking the privilege over particular evidence, the evidence is 
completely removed from the case.  The plaintiff’s case then goes for-
ward based on evidence not covered by the privilege.  If, after further 
proceedings, the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of her 
claim with nonprivileged evidence, then the court may dismiss her 
claim as it would with any plaintiff who cannot prove her case. 
Alternatively, if the privilege deprives the defendant of information 
that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim, 
then the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. 
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rations that privileged materials could not be disentangled from non-
privileged materials.273  Judge Walton, quoting In re United States,274 
wrote: “dismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum 
without giving the plaintiff her day in court . . . is indeed draconian.  
Denial of the forum provided under the Constitution for the resolu-
tion of disputes . . . is a drastic remedy that has rarely been in-
voked.”275
The same day as the decision in Edmonds, Judge Walton partially 
granted the government’s motion to quash Edmond’s deposition in 
the Burnett case, throwing out nine of the plaintiffs’ eighteen pro-
posed questions.276  The court based its decision on the reasoning set 
out in the Edmonds opinion.277  It also took the “mosaic” approach de-
scribed above, positing that although certain questions seemed in-
nocuous, privileged material would inevitably be disclosed during 
cross-examination.278  Ultimately, the plaintiffs were permitted only to 
ask Edmonds her name, when she came to the United States, the 
level of her education, her first job out of school, whether she was 
ever an employee of the federal government, when she worked for 
the government, whether she still worked for the government, and 
what her current employment was.279
Finally, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s ability to produce nonprivileged 
evidence, if the “very subject matter of the action” is a state secret, then 
the court should dismiss the plaintiff’s action based solely on the invo-
cation of the state secrets privilege.  While dismissal of an action based 
on the state secrets privilege is harsh, the results are harsh in either di-
rection and the state secrets doctrine finds the greater public good—
ultimately the less harsh remedy—to bed dismissal. 
Id. at 78 (quoting Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166–67). 
 273 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 79–81. 
 274 872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 275 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (quoting In re United States, 872 F.2d at 477 (ci-
tation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 276 Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 84; see also Posting of Dacha Dude to 
http://homepage.mac.com/kaaawa/iblog/C177199123/E1350718859/index.html 
(July 9, 2004, 11:09 EST) [hereinafter Permissible Questions for Edmonds]. 
 277 Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 82–83. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Permissible Questions for Edmonds, supra note 276.  The plaintiffs were not 
allowed to ask Edmonds the following questions: “2) When and where were you 
born?. . . 5) Where did you go to school? . . . .7) What did you focus your studies on 
in school?  8) What languages do you speak?  9) What is your fluency or proficiency 
in each of these languages? . . . 13) In what capacity have you been employed by the 
United States government?”  Id.  The plaintiffs were also not allowed to ask Edmonds 
a host of questions concerning the substance of her allegations set out in Grassley 
and Leahy’s letter to Ashcroft.  Id. 
RAPAFINAL.DOC 10/20/2006  11:48:35 AM 
2006] COMMENT 269 
 
That same month the OIG published its final report on the Ed-
monds matter, which Attorney General Ashcroft promptly classi-
fied.280  In January 2005, the OIG released an unclassified summary of 
its report.281  Though stating that a final determination as to 
Dickerson’s alleged espionage was beyond the scope of the report,282 
it concluded that some of Edmonds’ claims were supported by evi-
dence.283  Moreover, the OIG determined that the FBI could not 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 
terminated Edmonds if not for her allegations,284 and the OIG fur-
ther determined that the FBI’s overall investigation of her claims was 
insufficient.285  Finally, it recommended, among other things, that an 
employee from the FBI Language Services Section (or a special 
agent) interview each incoming contract linguist, that supervisors as-
sign each translation assignment, that a uniform policy be adopted 
for signing translation work orders, and that a system be installed to 
track which linguists handle which materials.286
In May 2005, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, in a 
one-line opinion that did not cite any cases or provide a basis for de-
cision, the lower court’s decision in Edmonds.287  The court took the 
unusual step of announcing the day before oral argument that the 
press would be barred from the proceeding, even though the gov-
ernment had already offered to argue the case publicly.288  Edmonds 
 280 Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1. 
 281 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF 
OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S ACTIONS WITH ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY 
CONTRACT LINGUIST, SIBEL EDMONDS, UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (2005), [hereinafter 
OIG Report], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf. 
 282 Id. at 2.  Dickerson was not named in the report. 
 283 Id. at 11 (“Edmonds’ assertions regarding the coworker, when viewed as a 
whole, raised substantial questions and were supported by various pieces of evi-
dence.”). 
 284 Id. at 30. 
 285 Id. at 34. 
 286 Id. at 32–34. 
 287 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 734 (2005). 
 288 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Edmonds, 161 F. App’x 6, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(No. 05-190), available at http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/ 
edmonds%20cert[1].%20petition.pdf.  The government offered to argue the case 
publicly on the assumption the courtroom would be cleared if the court wished to 
ask questions concerning classified information.  Id. at 47a.  Instead, the court or-
dered the press barred altogether.  Id. at 12–13.  Edmonds urged the Supreme Court 
to review this part of the case in addition to the state secrets privilege.  Id. at 26–29; 
see also Edmonds, Gagged but Not Dead, supra note 1 (“Numerous media related en-
tities tried to flex their lately weakened muscles and filed their motion to oppose this 
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filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in August 2005, which the Su-
preme Court denied in November 2005.289
C. How Does the Edmonds Case Impact National Security? 
Allegations of espionage and organized crime rings infiltrating 
the FBI have an obvious nexus with national security.  Yet Edmonds’ 
claims go even further than that.  The missing link in this whole tale, 
hinted at under constraint of gag orders, is its connection with Sep-
tember 11,290 articulated in her letter to September 11 Commissioner 
Tom Kean.291  Edmonds alleges that both before and after the attacks, 
information was intentionally withheld from special agents.292  Overall 
Edmonds charges that: 
Only one month after the catastrophic events of Sept. 11, while 
many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and 
information, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI’s largest 
and most important translation unit were covering up their past 
failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopard-
izing ongoing terrorist investigations.293
It must be emphasized that Edmonds’ allegations are just that, 
allegations.  Yet the OIG has concluded that her claims concerning 
her coworker’s activities were “supported by various pieces of evi-
dence.”294  Moreover, the imposition of gag orders on her only begs 
the question: What is the government trying to hide? 
Edmonds claims she can demonstrate that the actions of the 
State Department prior to September 11 amounted to “a blunder of a 
mammoth scale,”295 and that the excessive FBI secrecy in her case is 
part of an effort to cover up epic missteps in the September 11 inves-
ruling. The judges denied their motion, and cited no reason; when asked for a rea-
son they responded that they didn’t have to provide any reason.”). 
 289 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005). 
 290 Deliso, supra note 3; Horton, supra note 5; Kean Letter, supra note 239, at 1–7. 
 291 Kean Letter, supra note 239, at 1–7. 
 292 Id. at 3–7.  Specifically, Edmonds claims that evidence gleaned from counterin-
telligence investigations which intersected with terror investigations was intentionally 
blocked because it originated in certain countries with whom the State Department 
did not wish to harm diplomatic relations.  Id. at 7.  She also alleges that after Sep-
tember 11 her supervisor intentionally withheld from a special agent translated 
documents indicating that blueprints and other information on skyscrapers were be-
ing sent overseas prior to the attacks, as well as that visas were being illegally obtained 
from certain Middle Eastern embassies.  Id. at 6.
 293 Id. at 6. 
 294 OIG Report, supra note 281, at 11. 
 295 Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1. 
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tigation.296  Furthermore, one author has argued that Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft primarily invoked the state secrets privilege in order to 
protect the appointed officials who were implicated by Edmonds’ al-
legations.297
As Edmonds has said, “[i]t is way past time for a little bit of criti-
cal thinking.”298  In short, her allegations have everything to do with 
national security.299  The walls of the secure Sensitive Compartmented 
Information facility in which she testified can surely tell of what she 
knows about bribery of public officials,300 black market nuclear trans-
actions,301 and moles in the FBI in league with suspected organized 
criminals and terrorists.302
As invocation of the state secrets privilege has thus far success-
fully crippled the Edmonds case,303 the question becomes: Should 
countervailing national security interests be considered when the 
government invokes the privilege in the name of the common good? 
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
This Comment proposes that Congress pass a Rule of Evidence 
mandating that where a national security whistleblower alleges gov-
ernment wrongdoing304 that has threatened or is threatening national 
security, the state secrets privilege must be transformed into a quali-
fied privilege in which the government faces a heightened standard 
for successful invocation.  In a case in which such facts are alleged, a 
judge must evaluate any purportedly privileged materials in camera.  
The judge must then balance the national security interests associ-
ated with the plaintiff’s claim against the government’s interest in 
 296 Sibel Edmonds, Where Is Accountability?, ANTIWAR.COM, June 21, 2005, 
http://www.antiwar.com/edmonds/?articleid=6382. 
 297 Rose, supra note 2, at 281.  The author claims a congressional staffer told him 
this.  Id. 
 298 Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1. 
 299 Representative Maloney called Edmonds’ testimony before a House committee 
“absolutely and completely terrifying.”  Edmonds Press Release 2, supra note 11. 
 300 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 301 See Edmonds, Gagged but Not Dead, supra note 1; supra note 243 and accompany-
ing text.  Edmonds claims her allegations have to do with “a lot of illegal activities 
that include multi-billion dollar drug-smuggling operations, [and] black-market nu-
clear sales to terrorists and unsavory regimes . . . .” Christopher Deliso, “The Stakes Are 
Too High for Us to Stop Fighting Now”: An Interview with FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, 
ANTIWAR.COM, Aug. 15, 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=6934. 
 302 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 303 Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 734 (2005); Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 79–82 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 304 Congress should define “wrongdoing” to include both nonfeasance and mal-
feasance. 
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nondisclosure, and the government may only successfully resist dis-
covery if it can demonstrate that disclosure—even in camera to merely 
the litigant and counsel—presents a substantial possibility that na-
tional security will be endangered and outweighs the countervailing 
national security interests asserted by plaintiff.  A judge may interpret  
Congress’s definitions of “whistleblower” and “national security”  nar-
rowly or broadly.305  Moreover, the judge is to make use of in camera 
proceedings and protective orders as justice and national security re-
quire. 
Furthermore, the Rule should feature certain procedural and 
reporting requirements designed to balance the interests of the three 
branches of government.  First, there should be sanctions, civil and 
criminal, in order to check frivolous claims, thus preventing plaintiffs 
and counsel from wrongfully gaining access to sensitive informa-
tion.306  Second, either the judge or the department head invoking 
the privilege should have a duty to transmit all purportedly privileged 
materials to ranking members of Congress possessing security clear-
ances. 
A. Other Proposals for Reform 
The best-known, and most nearly successful, proposal to alter 
the state secrets privilege was Proposed Rule 509.307  As described 
above, it mostly codified Reynolds, broadened it in some places, and 
died at the hands of a Congress readying itself to take on President 
Nixon.308
Another approach to the privilege is reversion to the state of the 
law before Reynolds.  Though amorphous and vague, Justices Black, 
Frankfurter, and Jackson in Reynolds favored the status quo in state 
secrets cases.309  Specifically they agreed with the Third Circuit that 
a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence relevant to the is-
sues in a pending law suit involves a justiciable question, tradi-
 305 Congress should define the term “whistleblower” to at least include “current or 
former federal employees or civilians working under contract to the United States 
who, to their detriment or personal risk, bring to light fraud, waste, and abuse in 
government operations and agencies when such improprieties compromise the na-
tional security of the United States.”  National Security Whistleblowers Coalition, 
http://www.nswbc.org/purpose.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
 306 These sanctions, over and above Rule 11 sanctions, are intended to root out all 
but the soundest claims where a plaintiff may gain access to secret information. 
 307 See supra Part III.B. 
 308 Id. 
 309 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (Black, Frankfurter, and Jack-
son, Js., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 102. 
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tionally within the competence of the courts, which is to be de-
termined in accordance with the appropriate rules of evidence, 
upon the submission of the documents in question to the judge 
for his examination in camera.310
The Third Circuit’s holding is in accord with the spirit of the 
Rule this Comment proposes, but lacks specific procedural require-
ments that would make the state secrets privilege workable. 
One commentator has proposed a comparative standard in as-
sessing all state secrets claims.311  He argues that “[courts] should de-
termine whether the danger from discovery conducted under condi-
tions imposed by the court warrants withholding the information 
despite its disclosure value.”312  Yet such an approach—balancing the 
parties’ interests regardless of the type of case a plaintiff brings—
departs from the underlying goal of the state secrets privilege, which 
is protection of the common good.313  The approach presupposes that 
the litigant’s need in any case should be balanced against the asserted 
interests in nondisclosure, not contemplating that only in certain 
cases will a comparative standard serve the public interest more than 
an absolute privilege. 
One commentator has proposed granting opposing counsel a 
special Justice Department security clearance where disclosure would 
harm the nation but the privileged material has the “strong potential 
to aid the opposing party.”314  This is not the most efficient or realistic 
approach, given how long clearances may take.315  Again, the com-
mentator proposes a comparative approach where the litigant can 
show a requisite level of need.316  This Comment proposes a more fo-
cused approach designed to protect the very same national security 
that the state secrets privilege itself strives to protect. 
Another commentator urges the adoption of either of two pro-
posed statutes.317  The first statute allows a plaintiff to recover dam-
ages, between a minimum of $1000 and a maximum of $250,000, 
 310 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 311 The Military and State Secrets Privilege, supra note 27, at 584–86. 
 312 Id. at 584 (footnote omitted). 
 313 See generally supra note 21. 
 314 Brian M. Tomney, Note, 57 ME. L. REV. 641, 662 (2005). 
 315 For example, it takes the FBI six to nine months to process top secret security 
clearances for state and local law enforcement.  Security Clearance Process for State 
and Local Law Enforcement, http://www.fbi.gov/clearance/securityclearance.htm 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
 316 Id. (explaining the proposed standard would apply wherever privileged evi-
dence has the “strong potential to aid the opposing party.”). 
 317 Gardner, supra note 142, at 568. 
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where the invocation of the state secrets privilege has resulted in dis-
missal or has substantially affected the plaintiff’s case and where the 
plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable possibility that he or she 
would have prevailed on the merits.318  The second statute permits a 
plaintiff, after successful invocation of the privilege, to petition the 
department head invoking it for a settlement compensating him or 
her, with leave to appeal to a State Secrets Compensation Board.319  
The proposals, while striving to address the interests of plaintiffs with 
legitimate cases, have weaknesses.  These weaknesses include the risk 
of “graymail,”320 the unworkability of a standard requiring a judge at 
the infancy of a case to determine whether there is a “reasonable pos-
sibility” of success on the merits,321 a compensation scheme which re-
sembles a workers’ compensation scheme in its inability to make a 
plaintiff whole, and a lack of equitable relief. 
Another scholar contends that where the government asserts the 
state secrets privilege, the statute of limitations for an action should 
be tolled until there is no longer a need for secrecy.322  Yet an asserted 
need for secrecy may linger until after a litigant is dead, as was the 
case with the classified accident report in Reynolds.323
Finally, two commentators argue that the state secrets privilege is 
in tension with the constitutional order, particularly separation of 
powers.324  The Supreme Court, however, refused to treat the privi-
lege as a constitutional matter in Reynolds,325 and in its later encoun-
ters with the matter in Nixon and Tenet expressed no such concerns.326  
 318 Id. at 602–03. 
 319 Id. at 606–07. 
 320 The Supreme Court has defined so-called "graymail" as the phenomenon of 
bringing “individual lawsuits . . . to induce [an agency] to settle a case (or prevent its 
filing) out of fear that any effort to litigate the action would reveal classified informa-
tion that may undermine ongoing covert operations.  Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 
(2005).  The low threshold required for compensation in Gardner’s proposed stat-
utes leaves the government particularly vulnerable to graymail.  Gardner, supra note 
142, at 602–03, 606–07. 
 321 Gardner, supra note 142, at 602. 
 322 James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875, 910 (1966). 
 323 See Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18545 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 
S. Ct. 1909 (2006). 
 324 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 112 (arguing the privilege “threatens to 
undermine the constitutional balance of power . . . .”); see also Reynolds v. United 
States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951) (holding that to permit the executive to con-
clusively determine claims of privilege is to “unconstitutionally abdicate the judicial 
function”). 
 325 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). 
 326 See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974). 
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In fact, in Nixon the Court hinted that Article II of the Constitution 
requires some measure of deference to the Executive where military 
and diplomatic secrets are concerned.327
B. Advantages of This Proposal 
The Rule this Comment proposes corrects a flaw in the current 
state secrets privilege and otherwise leaves it intact, recognizing that 
the prevailing interest at all times is that of the common good.  At 
present, the privilege fails to protect this common good where it 
serves to halt a suit by a national security whistleblower.328  This 
Comment addresses this malfunction and harmonizes the interests of 
the three branches of government. 
By imposing a stricter standard on the government where a whis-
tleblower alleges threats to national security, only the most direct and 
serious of dangers to national security resulting from disclosure will 
prevent such a plaintiff from having a fair day in court.  In camera 
proceedings and protective orders, where necessary, will preserve the 
government’s interest in secrecy while allowing plaintiffs to seek 
damages, reinstatement to their jobs, and restoration of their security 
clearances.  Reforming the state secrets privilege in this way will give 
teeth to current statutory protections for whistleblowers,329 which cur-
rently are at the whim of the privilege as now interpreted.  Overall 
this will serve the common good by helping patriotic, vigilant citizens 
to remain in their posts, free of retaliation, and report waste, fraud, 
and threats to national security as they emerge.  The Edmonds case il-
lustrates just what a whistleblower may report and just what prospects 
for relief he or she may hope to gain in the face of the state secrets 
privilege.330
The procedural requirements of the proposed Rule address the 
needs of the three branches.  Required in camera review of purport-
edly privileged materials has the advantages of putting the govern-
ment to its proof, rooting out bad faith invocations of the privilege, 
and familiarizing judges with the sort of evidence over which privi-
 327 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (“[President Nixon] does not place his claim of privi-
lege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets.  As to these areas of Art. II 
duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential re-
sponsibilities.”). 
 328 See supra Part IV.B. 
 329 FBI employees are not entitled to the protection of federal whistleblower stat-
utes, but rather must seek redress internally.  Geoffrey Gray, Code of Quiet, VILLAGE 
VOICE, June 19–25, 2002, at 43.  FBI whistleblower regulations currently do not offer 
protection to contractors such as Edmonds.  See 28 C.F.R. § 27 (2005). 
 330 See supra Part IV.B. 
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lege is claimed so that the judiciary as a whole can begin forming a 
more coherent approach to the privilege.  In camera proceedings and 
protective orders will accommodate the government’s need for se-
crecy. 
Requiring either the judge or the Executive to transmit purport-
edly privileged materials to members of Congress with security clear-
ances may be the most novel aspect of this proposal.331  It offers the 
advantage of giving at least some members of Congress an idea as to 
what materials the Executive is attempting to keep secret.  From this 
point there can be a dialogue as to Executive secrecy and its propri-
ety.  This requirement arms Congress with the tools to further refine 
the state secrets privilege without having to “rule in a vacuum.”332
Essentially, the aim of this proposal is to protect the national in-
terest.  As one dissenting court of appeals judge explained in a recent 
commercial case upholding use of the privilege: 
[P]ersons who serve the government must have a reasonable way 
of resolving disputes.  It is neither in the nation’s interest, nor can 
it be the nation’s intention, to bar judicial relief when disputes 
arise among persons who serve sensitive government business . . . . 
     The judicial obligation is to enable resolution, with safeguards 
appropriate to the subject matter. Although there may be areas of 
such sensitivity that no judicial exposure can be countenanced—
such as, perhaps, the formation of the Manhattan Project—there 
is no suggestion that the sensitive information [at issue in this 
case] can not be protected by well-established judicial procedures 
for preserving the security of sensitive information . . . . 
Trials in camera of issues subject to secrecy restraints are not  
new . . . .333
How would Edmonds play out under this proposed Rule?  First, as 
a threshold matter, or at any point during the proceedings, the judge 
would have to determine whether her claims were frivolous.  As long 
as she was free of this stigma, the judge would review all purportedly 
privileged materials.  The national security interests associated with 
Edmonds’ claims would be balanced against the government’s inter-
 331 In 1998 Congress debated legislation which would have allowed “executive 
branch employees to directly inform members of Congress or their staff representa-
tives of waste, fraud, or violations of law by administrators.”  Weaver & Pallitto, supra 
note 14, at 107.  The Justice Department objected to the legislation on separation of 
powers grounds, and it never became law.  Id.  This Comment’s proposal differs in 
that only members of Congress with security clearances would receive the informa-
tion, thus rendering the intrusion on the Executive minimal. 
 332 Zagel, supra note 322, at 891. 
 333 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., 423 F.3d 1260, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (New-
man, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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est in secrecy.  That is, if she alleged terrorist investigations were 
compromised by sympathizers in the translation department, then 
the government would have to assert national security interests in se-
crecy which outweighed this; if she alleged black market nuclear ac-
tivities, the government somehow would have to assert an interest in 
secrecy which would outweigh that.  If necessary all further proceed-
ings would be in camera and subject to protective orders.  All purport-
edly privileged materials would be transmitted to members of Con-
gress with security clearances. 
C. Arguments against this proposal 
One issue facing this Rule is the scope and usefulness of its prac-
tical application.  The state secrets privilege is a narrow area of evi-
dence law, and whistleblower suits are a mere subset of state secrets 
suits.  Yet, after the September 11 attacks, there has been a flood of 
national security whistleblowers alleging all sorts of wrongdoing 
which contributed to the most bloody terrorist attack ever carried out 
on American soil.334  The emphasis should not be on the quantity of 
suits, but rather on their magnitude.  The proposed Rule strives to ac-
commodate a class of litigants who allege wrongdoing which could 
have implications for all Americans. 
Another argument against this proposal is that balancing matters 
of national security may not be justiciable.335  It should be noted, 
however, that in the present state secrets calculus this is precisely 
what courts do, though with a significant measure of deference to the 
Executive.336  Moreover, the proposed Rule invites congressional over-
sight and at all times guarantees the secrecy which the government 
seeks. 
It also can be argued that the political process will punish those 
Presidents whose officers use the state secrets privilege to escape 
blame for damage to national security.  Yet excessive invocation of 
the privilege, combined with gag orders on litigants337 and attempts to 
gag members of Congress,338 stifles the political process before it can 
even take place. 
 334 See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text. 
 335 McCormick argues, where the privilege in question is not the state secrets privi-
lege, that “judicial duties require an appraisal of private interests that must be recon-
ciled with conflicting public policies.  A judge may thus be better qualified than the 
executive to weigh both interests and to strike a proper balance.”  1 MCCORMICK ET 
AL., supra note 30, at 438. 
 336 See supra Part III.A. 
 337 See supra note 5. 
 338 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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Yet another possible criticism of this proposal is that it does not 
go far enough.  A strict interpretation of the proposed Rule would, 
for example, leave the surveillance plaintiffs out in the cold.  While it 
is unacceptable that victims of constitutional violations may be with-
out forums, this Comment does not dispute the basic tenet that the 
common good must be preserved above all else, meaning some liti-
gants’ claims cannot go forward.  Under this proposal, however, a 
judge is always free to interpret “whistleblower” or “national security” 
broadly, meaning a plaintiff exposing a practice of warrantless surveil-
lance could be a whistleblower, and a system of mass constitutional 
violations could be held to threaten national security. 
Still another criticism of this proposal is that in camera exposure 
of privileged materials to judges, and transmission to select members 
of Congress, could harm national security by diminishing the quality 
of executive communications by revealing them to parties for whom 
they were never intended.339  Executive officers, so the argument 
goes, will have a disincentive to pursue the ends of state if there is an 
ever-present risk that they will be subject to judicial and congressional 
scrutiny.  Yet under this proposal, privileged materials will never be 
subjected to “curious and impertinent eyes.”340  There seems little 
danger in exposing sensitive evidence to federal judges appointed by 
the President and approved by the Senate.341  Moreover, the only 
members of Congress who will ever handle state secrets under this 
proposal are those who have already been granted top secret clear-
ance by the executive. 
This leads to another argument against this proposal: if the dan-
ger to the executive is minimal, then all state secrets cases should be 
governed by the provisions set out in this Comment, not just national 
security whistleblower cases.  There are two reasons why this argu-
ment is unavailing.  First, some measure of deference is due to the 
executive and the judiciary, and this proposal advocates a compro-
mise position in recognition of this.  Though it may seem palatable to 
assail any claim of privilege which seems to have been made in bad 
faith, judges thus far have seemed uneasy at the prospect of examin-
 339 See supra note 130 and accompanying text, for Wigmore’s four conditions 
which give rise to privilege and how they are intended to foster robust communica-
tions which the community prefers to be protected. 
 340 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 97 (citing the Trial of Maha Rajah Nun-
docomar, (1775) 20 State Trials 923, 1057 (Sup. Ct. of Judicature, Bengal)). 
 341 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, at §§ 509–20 (“[D]isclosure in camera to 
one federal district judge, whose appointment was ratified by the Senate itself, does 
not threaten the national security more than disclosure to the employees of the ex-
ecutive agency who classified the information.”). 
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ing materials which they do not feel are for their eyes.342  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has cautioned that deference is owed to the Ex-
ecutive where state secrets are at stake.343  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, an important distinction must be made between state se-
crets cases in which plaintiffs’ allegations have a direct nexus with na-
tional security and those which, while adjudicating important rights, 
feature an attenuated nexus.  In the sort of national security whistle-
blower case which this proposal envisions, a plaintiff alleges that 
waste, fraud, corruption, and the like have put lives in danger;344 thus 
a departure from the typical state secrets rule is appropriate because 
a whistleblower plaintiff permitted to pursue his or her claim can 
help put an end to such practices.  A plaintiff in another sort of state 
secrets case, such as an employment discrimination case, does not al-
lege that national security has been or is being directly threatened; 
the same danger of revealing secrets remains, and there is much less 
of a reason to depart from the Reynolds framework where the benefit 
to the litigant does not also bring a benefit to national security. 
Finally, one can argue that tinkering with the state secrets privi-
lege in this way is unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court hinted in 
Nixon that the Constitution requires some deference to the Executive 
where it seeks to protect military and domestic secrets.345  Yet this 
Comment leaves the state secrets privilege mostly intact and only al-
ters it in an area in which it does more harm than good.  Further-
more, there is a strong argument that the current state secrets privi-
lege requires courts to unconstitutionally “abdicate the judicial 
function.”346
CONCLUSION 
One unfortunate consequence of allegations like Edmonds’ is 
that, uncontested for so long, they tend to calcify into cynicism to-
wards government.  Indeed, a 2004 Zogby poll revealed that half of 
New York City residents believed that the government had fore-
knowledge of the September 11 attacks and consciously failed to 
act.347  Perhaps most disconcerting is that among those under thirty 
 342 See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
 343 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710–11 (1974). 
 344 For example, a plaintiff may allege that persons working for the FBI are abet-
ting suspected terrorists. 
 345 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710. 
 346 See Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 347 Zogby International, Half of New Yorkers Believe US Leaders Had Foreknowl-
edge of Impending 9-11 Attacks and “Consciously Failed” To Act (Aug. 30, 2004), 
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=855 [hereinafter Zogby Poll].  Ac-
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years of age, who in the decades to come will be inheriting the reigns 
of this republic, 62.8% held that view.348  As President Carter once 
said, “if we despise our own government, we have no future.”349
Over 13,000 individuals have signed Sibel Edmonds’ online peti-
tion seeking release of the classified OIG report.350  Members of Con-
gress have pledged support.351  And for her part, Edmonds has vowed 
to soldier on: 
In the past three years, I have been threatened; I have been 
gagged several times; I have continuously been prevented from 
pursuing my due process; all reports and investigations looking 
into my case have been classified; and every governmental or in-
vestigative authority dealing with my case has been shut up. . . . 
     [But] for those of you who may think that since I have been 
gagged and stopped by almost all available official channels, I 
must be ready to vaporize into thin air, please think again. I am 
gagged, but not dead; not yet.352
Congress must reform the state secrets privilege, and it must be-
gin to do so by protecting national security whistleblowers.  No doc-
trine designed to protect the common good should be used as a 
sword to strike down allegations that the common good is in danger. 
cording to a July 2006 Scripps Howard/Ohio University poll, thirty-six percent of 
Americans nationwide hold this view, including “a majority of young adults.”  Tho-
mas Hargrove, Third of Americans Suspect 9-11 Government Conspiracy, SCRIPPS NEWS, 
http://www.scrippsnews.com/911poll (last visited August 2, 2006). 
 348 Zogby Poll, supra note 347. 
 349 Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2 (Jan. 20, 1977). 
 350 Sibel Edmonds, Release of Classified DOJ-IG Report on FBI Cover-Up Petition, 
http://www.petitiononline.com/deniz18/petition.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
 351 Edmonds Press Release 2, supra note 11. 
 352 Edmonds, Gagged, but Not Dead, supra note 1. 
